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"Officer, Where's My Stuff?"1
The Constitutional Implications of a




Property can have no more dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy
than one who would make its possession a pretext for unequal or
exclusive civil rights.2
Although estimates vary widely,3 homeless people constitute a
substantial component of the country's population. As large
numbers of homeless people continue to congregate in the public
parks and on the thoroughfares of the nation's cities, politicians and
social service providers are engaged in a sometimes caustic debate
over how to "solve" the problem of homelessness! Many cities and
* JD, 2003, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California. The author would
like to thank Angela Harris, Annie Decker, and Donna Maeda for their perceptive
readings of earlier drafts, as well as the clients, staff, and volunteers of Suitcase Clinic
Legal Services for their inspiration and guidance.
1. Clive Whistle, A Long Fight to Protect the Possessions of the Poor, STREET SPIRIT,
August 2001, at 1.
2. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. A "one-night head count" of overnight shelters conducted by the U.S. Census
Bureau on March 27, 2000 yielded a figure of 170,706. ANNETTA C. SMITH AND DENISE I.
SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EMERGENCY AND TRANSITIONAL SHELTER POPULATION:
2000, Census Special Reports Series CENSR/01-2 at 5 (2001). Additional surveys taken
at soup kitchens, on the street, and in other locations over the next two nights expanded
the count to 280,527. Estimates of the total homeless population are significantly higher.
See, e.g., Juanita E. Miller, Poverty Among the Homeless, Ohio State University Extension
Fact Sheet HYG-5711-98 (1998), (citing estimates ranging from 200,000 to as high as
600,000) at http://ohioline.osu.edu/hyg-fact/5000/5711.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2003).
4. Recent developments in San Francisco exemplify the nature of these debates. See,
e.g., Rone Tempest, San Francisco Rethinks Cash Aid to Homeless, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002,
California Metro Section, at 1 (noting protests against business-backed cash assistance
reduction measure authored by Supervisor Gavin Newsom that "thwarted several of
Newsom's public appearances, forcing the supervisor to leave under police escort.");
Ilene Lelchuk, Lawsuit Over Prop. N Voter Guide; Homeless Advocates Say It's Misleading,
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courts have responded to homelessness by thoroughly criminalizing
homeless people's basic life activities and arbitrarily depriving them
of their personal belongings. Homeless people lack the basic liberty
to be anywhere legally, and their right to own even a few personal
belongings is at best insecure and at worst unrecognized. Caught
between hostile municipalities and unsympathetic courts, homeless
people increasingly are being deprived of their ability to own
property. In American political theory, ownership of property has
long served as one of the foundations of citizenship. This article
contends that our ostensibly liberal and republican society should
find the de facto property disability visited upon homeless people
constitutionally troubling.
Over the past two decades, municipal leaders in a number of
American cities have responded to business and tourism concerns
by aggressively enforcing criminal laws against sleeping in public,
loitering, camping, and other activities. Enforcement of these
"quality of life" crimes tends to proscribe most of the essential life
activities-eating, sleeping, and other basic functions usually carried
out in private homes-that homeless people must involuntarily
perform in public.6 Advocates for the civil rights of the homeless
have condemned many such policies for displacing homeless people
to other cities and violating their constitutional rights while doing
little to alleviate their problems.7 Despite their varying levels of
success and questionable constitutionality, simplistically punitive
approaches seem to be winning out over the more complex
affordable housing, drug and mental health treatment, outreach,
and job training programs proposed by homeless advocates.8 City
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2002, at A15 (describing lawsuit challenging description of
Newsom's ballot measure in voter information guide); Ilene Lelchuk, Campaign 2002; Bay
Area Impact; S.F. Homeless Crisis Spills Onto Ballot; Rival Propositions Vary on Cash Grants,
City Services, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2002 (hereafter "Campaign 2002"), at Al (comparing
Newsom's proposal with rival ballot measure introduced by former Supervisor Tom
Ammiano, widely believed to be Newsom's foremost challenger in upcoming San
Francisco mayoral race. (Voters will visit the polls in November 2003. Eds.).
5. See generally Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical
Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV.
631 (1992); Comment, Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomeless" Laws, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 595 (1989); Nancy Wright, Not in Anyone's Backyard: Ending the "Contest of
Nonresponsibility" and Implementing Long-Term Solutions to Homelessness, 2 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 163 (1995).
6. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295
(1991); text accompanying notes 18-26, infra.
7. Wright, supra note 5, at 180-81 (criticizing San Francisco's "Matrix" program).
8. Nancy Wright describes a syndrome she calls "compassion fatigue": "Homeless
people are increasingly regarded as the core of an urban problem that needs to be
eliminated in order for communities to properly function." She observes that forced
migration of homeless people has become the preferred municipal "solution" to this
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officials worry that such social services will attract homeless
migrants from other, less "tolerant" municipalities.' Responding to
these fears, many cities have opted to cut services and increase
police activity, ° often making life for the homeless so difficult that
they are forced to seek refuge elsewhere. The cumulative effect of
these policies is to criminalize most aspects of homeless existence.
"Property sweeps," the often arbitrary seizure and frequent
destruction of homeless people's personal property, are a key
element of many such policies." Belongings are seized while
homeless people are asleep, 2 momentarily away from their
possessions,13 or under arrest. 4  As Harry Simon points out,
"property sweeps have disastrous consequences for the homeless.""
Loss of bedding, identification, medicine, and personal mementos
"deprive[s] the homeless of the means to survive and rob[s] them of
basic human dignity." 6
Property sweeps also raise constitutional questions under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 Courts' responses to
these constitutional challenges illuminate the striking and complex
interactions between property, legal personhood, and social class in
America. In a society that has always viewed protection of private
property as one of the primary functions of government, many
courts nonetheless have proven unwilling to recognize that
problem. Wright, supra note 5, at 174-75.
9. See, e.g., Patrick Hoge, Answers Exist, Experts Say, but Take Commitment and Money,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2001, at A20 (quoting George Smith, head of the Mayor's Office on
Homelessness, who "thinks new homeless people are constantly arriving from counties
that are less generous or tolerant than San Francisco").
10. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors recently passed an ordinance outlawing
public urination and imposing fines up to $500 on violators. Kevin Fagan, Urban Studies:
Filthy Streets of San Francisco; San Francisco: "Urinetown," Not the Musical, S.F. CHRON.,
July 31, 2002, at E3. In November 2002, city voters faced two competing ballot measures,
both of which cut cash assistance to the homeless. Lelchuk, Campaign 2002, supra note 4,
at Al.
11. Simon, supra note 5, at 647, 670-72.
12. See, e.g., Whistle, supra note 1, at 1.
13. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1465 (1996).
14. See, e.g., State of Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991).
15. Simon, supra note 5, at 672.
16. Id. One homeless resident of San Francisco described his horror and frustration at
losing all of his belongings to a Department of Public Works crew while he slept. ("All of
my things-my just-cleaned blankets.. , my little radio and my new batteries, but most
terrifying of all, my BACKPACK with my meds-were gone! [Wlorse than anything else
was the loss of my meds. ") Whistle, supra note 1, at 1.
17. Simon, supra note 5, at 670.
18. See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Democracy, Justice, and the Multiplicity of Voices:
Alternatives to the Federalist Vision, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 232 (1989) (discussing the
Federalists' concern with private property protection as a counter to possible
majoritarian tyranny).
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homeless people exercise any kind of property interest whatsoever
in their belongings. Municipal policies depriving homeless people
of their scant belongings, combined with courts' unwillingness to
provide any remedy, leave homeless people doubly dispossessed.
Indeed, the law enforcement, public works, and judicial forces
converging on homeless people and their personal belongings have
created a de facto "property disability," a situation in which many
homeless people seem to exercise no property rights at all.
This comment argues that the imposition of a property
disability on the homeless raises serious constitutional questions,
which in turn suggest a range of remedies. Part I discusses several
recent decisions involving legal challenges to the confiscation and
destruction of homeless people's property. These decisions reveal a
wide range of judicial preconceptions about whether homeless
people have any legally recognizable property interest in their
personal possessions, and confirm the extent to which homeless
people are not fully recognized at law. Taken together, municipal
enforcement and judicial construction have imposed a de facto
property disability on the homeless. Part II considers whether
imposition of such a property disability contravenes constitutional
guarantees. Answering this question requires a reexamination of
the history and philosophical underpinnings of the Reconstruction
Amendments, most notably the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, all of which suggest that contemporary
courts should find this property disability constitutionally suspect.
Part III explores various potential remedies, including
constitutionally based arguments for a fundamental property right,
compensation under the Takings Clause, and considering
homelessness a suspect classification for Equal Protection purposes.
Because none of these remedies alone addresses the structure of
property law that contributes to the dispossession of the homeless,
the conclusion suggests that the homeless have a right to safe,
supportive, and permanent shelter. Shelter is a precondition to both
exercising property interests and participating in civic life as
envisioned by the Constitution and the egalitarian underpinnings of
the American political tradition.
I. A Property Disability in Fact and Law
Courts analyzing constitutional challenges to property sweeps
routinely must decide whether homeless people have any
recognizable property interests. Although these decisions draw on
different constitutional doctrines, they show both a substantive and
a rhetorical disregard for the property claims of homeless
individuals. First, as a matter of doctrine, courts tend to analyze
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homeless people's property interests spatially, in terms of where
homeless people are or are not allowed to be. These decisions
generally turn on either the Fourth Amendment question of whether
homeless people have any reasonable expectation of privacy in their
belongings, or on whether homeless people trespassing on public or
private land may retain their property. Second, as a rhetorical
matter, many courts seem to have difficulty distinguishing between
homeless people's property and garbage. Municipal policies
grounded in aesthetics guide some of this reasoning, although some
courts have moved well beyond mere aesthetics into a powerful
rhetoric of filth and contagion that justifies their construction of a
reduced or nonexistent property interest for homeless people.
Finally, a comparison of takings decisions brought under the Fifth
Amendment by homeless people and by real estate developers
reveals courts' radically different conceptions of what kinds of
property interests can and should be recognized and protected at
law. These cases confirm that the law, in many instances, does not
recognize that homeless people have any property rights worth
protecting.
A. Judicial Treatment of Homeless People's Personal Property
1. No Place To Be: The Regulation of Space, Liberty, and Property
Jeremy Waldron observes that one of the primary effects of
property law is to divide a jurisdiction into "spatially defined
regions" and "give us a way of determining, in the case of each
place, who is allowed to be in that place and who is not." 9 In the
United States, many of our most basic life functions-such as eating,
sleeping, excreting, and engaging in sexual activity-are thought of
as private activities. Accordingly, these activities are usually
performed, as the saying goes, "in the privacy of one's home."
Homeless people by definition, however, lack just such a secure,
defensible space in which they have an unquestioned right to be.
Or, as Waldron puts it, "there is no place governed by a private
property rule where [a homeless person] is allowed to be whenever
he chooses, no place governed by a private property rule from
which he may not at any time be excluded as a result of someone's
say-so."'" As a result, homeless people can perform many private
life activities only at the whim of private property owners (and
public officials) who exercise the power to exclude others from
various kinds of property: "the homeless person is utterly and at all
19. Waldron, supra note 6, at 296.
20. Id. at 299.
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times at the mercy of others."21
Waldron suggests that the "libertarian fantasy" of a world in
which all places are governed by private property rules would be
"catastrophic for the homeless," and that our society avoids this
catastrophe only because there are some spaces still "held as
collective property and made available for common use."22 These
common spaces, however, are increasingly regulated,23  often
precisely in response to concerns about homelessness.24  The
prospects for homeless people in this increasingly regulated public
environment are grim:
What is emerging-and it is not just a matter of fantasy-is a state
of affairs in which a million or more citizens have no place to
perform elementary human activities like urinating, washing,
sleeping, cooking, eating, and standing around. Legislators voted
for by eople who own private places in which they can do all
these thigs are increasingly deciding to make public places
available only for activities other than these primal human tasks.25
21. Id.
22. Id. at 300.
23. The climate of exasperation and persecution surrounding homelessness in
American cities has grown increasingly harsh in recent years:
Cities that once pitied the homeless ... now see them as threats to safety
and public order. Tampa has ordered that they not be served food in
public parks. Tucson is considering privatizing sidewalks so adjacent
businesses can shoo them away. The National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty says that of 50 cities it surveyed, 48 percent
have initiated police sweeps of the homeless over the last two years.
Peter T. Kilborn, Gimme Shelter: Same Song, New Tune, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, Section 4,
at5.
24. MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES, at 232-
34 (1990). Davis describes how the City of Los Angeles has attempted to improve the
"liveability" of corporate sections of Downtown by creating "an opulent complex of
squares, fountains, world-class public art, exotic shrubbery, and avant-garde street
furniture" along pedestrian corridors. This transformation of urban common space has
been accompanied by "a merciless struggle to make public facilities and spaces as
'unliveable' as possible for the homeless and the poor." For example, the city has
decided against providing public toilets in areas frequented by homeless people. Davis
observes that the Community Redevelopment Association prefers "the solution of
,quasi-public restrooms'-meaning toilets in restaurants, art galleries and office
buildings-which can be made available to tourists and office workers while being
denied to vagrants and other unsuitables." This strategy also denies homeless people
access to water for drinking and washing, forcing many to use the dangerously polluted
Los Angeles River. Davis also confirms that police routinely sweep the streets,
confiscating homeless people's makeshift shelters and belongings.
25. Waldron, supra note 6, at 301. Davis articulates this "privatization" of public
space explicitly in class terms, arguing that the "destruction of accessible public space"
in Los Angeles signals the death of the "Olmsteadian vision" of "public landscapes and
parks as social safety-valves, mixing classes and ethnicities in common (bourgeois)
recreations and enjoyments." DAVIS, supra note 24 at 226-27 (emphasis in original). In
place of this vision, Davis sees what he calls "Fortress L.A.": a wasteland of gated
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Waldron views this transformation of public, common space
into space only suitable for activities that complement rather than
replace those usually exercised "in private" as "one of the most
callous and tyrannical exercises of power in modern times by a
(comparatively) rich and complacent majority against a minority of
their less fortunate fellow human beings."26 The simultaneous
regulation of life-sustaining activities in both public and private
space leaves homelesspeople with literally "no place to be"-that is,
fundamentally unfree.
Waldron distinguishes the basic kind of liberty that homeless
people lack from the more specific freedoms guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights.28 At least one court, however, has taken note of the
constitutional implications of policies aimed at proscribing homeless
existence through regulation of public space and seizure of personal
belongings. In Pottinger v. City of Miami, 2 9 homeless residents and
civil rights activists challenged a City of Miami policy designed, in
their view, "to harass the homeless and remove them from sight."3"
City police had, on several occasions, seized and destroyed the
personal belongings of homeless people who were sleeping in city
parks.3 The court characterized the litigation as "an inevitable
conflict between the need of homeless individuals to perform
essential, life-sustaining acts in public and the responsibility of the
government to maintain orderly, aesthetically pleasing public
parks." The court also observed that "[e]xcept for a fortunate few,
most homeless individuals have no alternative to living in public
areas," and found that "there is no public place where they can
perform basic, essential acts such as sleeping without the possibility
of being arrested."3
In this situation, homeless residents' personal property was
never secure. Plaintiff Peter Carter testified that he and a number of
other homeless people were arrested one night for sleeping in a
park. When they returned to the park after being released by the
police, all of their belongings were gone. 4 This was just one
communities, constant surveillance and security, and architecture designed around
exclusion of racial and underclass 'others.' See generally id. at 223-60.
26. Waldron, supra note 6, at 301-02.
27. Id. at 302.
28. Id. at 319.
29. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
30. Id. at 1555. One plaintiff testified that the assistant city manager told her that
"the City did not want unsightly homeless people in the developing downtown area."
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1568.
31. Id. at 1555-56, 1560.
32. Id. at 1554.
33. Id. at 1558, 1560.
34. Id. at 1560.
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instance, according to plaintiffs, of the City's "pattern and practice
of seizing and destroying [homeless people's] personal property or
forcing them to abandon it at arrest sites."" The court found that
this pattern and practice violated the Fourth Amendment, holding
that society was disposed to recognize plaintiffs' reasonable
expectation of privacy in their personal belongings and that "the
City's interest in having clean parks [was] outweighed by the more
immediate interest of the plaintiffs in not having their personal
belongings destroyed."36 For the Pottinger court, because homeless
individuals lacked any private space in which they legally could be,
their last shreds of privacy had to be located in their personal
belongings, thus entitling these belongings to Fourth Amendment
protection.37 The Pottinger decision elucidates that access to private,
residential space is closely related to the exercise of a property
interest in personal belongings. A life lived entirely in public is, in
many respects, a life in which few basic freedoms and activities can
be performed securely. One such freedom is the ability to possess
and control personal belongings without undue and arbitrary
interference by police and other public officials. Fourth
Amendment rights, essential to the conception of property that is
shielded against government oppression, turn out to be contingent
on possession of private space-a troubling anomaly given the
Supreme Court's oft-quoted admonishment that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places."38
Other courts have been unwilling to recognize that homeless
people exercised property interests at all, especially where they had
no right to be in the places from which police sought to remove
them. A pair of Eleventh Circuit cases decided within one year of
each other, D'Aguanno v. Gallagher39 and Church v. City of Huntsville,40
ominously indicate that there is no place-public or private-in
which homeless people may be secure in their personal belongings
and effects. In D'Aguanno, four homeless individuals had camped
on an undeveloped piece of private property for periods ranging
35. Id. at 1570.
36. Id. at 1572-73.
37. As the court explained, "the interior of the bedrolls and bags or boxes of personal
effects belonging to homeless individuals in this case is perhaps the last trace of privacy
they have. In addition, the property of homeless individuals is often located in the parks
or under the overpasses that they consider their homes .... [U]nder the circumstances of
this case, it appears that society is prepared to recognize plaintiffs' expectation of
privacy in their personal property as reasonable." Id. at 1572.
38. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
39. 827 F. Supp. 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 877 (11th
Cir. 1995).
40. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994).
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41
from four months to six years. In December 1991, four sheriff's
deputies "visited the campsite and destroyed [plaintiffs'] shelters
and personal property, including food items and furniture."42 The
plaintiffs brought several state and federal constitutional claims, all
of which the District Court rejected on qualified immunity grounds,
holding that there was no controlling case law that would have
alerted the officers to the plaintiffs' "clearly established"
constitutional rights.
After holding that plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of
privacy because they were trespassing on private land,43 the court
went on to deny their due process claims by distinguishing an
Eleventh Circuit case in which the plaintiff was deprived of a federal
loan, "the terms of which specifically created a property interest and
a right to due process protection."44  To the court, the precedent
involving the loan did not "give defendants notice that plaintiffs
had a right to due process given the facts of this case. "4  On this
basis, the court refused to recognize that plaintiffs had any property
interest in their personal belongings. Indeed, the court appears to
have assumed without analysis that because the plaintiffs were
homeless and trespassing on private land, they lost all legal claim to
the personal property that they brought with them.
The Eleventh Circuit substantially ratified this view in affirming
the District Court's disposition of this part of the case. In the circuit
court's view, Supreme Court authority supporting "the general
proposition that the Fifth Amendment requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the government deprives a person of
his property" was "insufficient to overcome a qualified immunity
defense" because the rights asserted were too "abstract":
[11f the test of "clearly established law" were to be applied at this
level of generality. .. [pilaintiffs would be able to convert the rule
of qualified immunity... into a rule of virtually unqualified
liability simply by alleging [a] violation of extremely abstract
rights.... Plaintiffs have cited no authority that clearly states the
circumstances in which homeless persons retain a property
41. D'Aguanno, 827 F. Supp. at 1560. By way of comparison, the statutory period for
an adverse possession claim in Florida is seven years. Fla. Stats. Ann. §§ 95.12, 95.18
(Matthew Bender 2002).
42. D'Aguanno, 827 F. Supp. at 1560.
43. D'Aguanno, 827 F. Supp. at 1562. It seems that the owner of the property did not
know that the plaintiffs were camping on her land until after the incident occurred, and
that the police undertook to destroy the plaintiffs' belongings on their own initiative. See
Affidavit of Rhoda Bouzek, Paragraph 5, 50 F.3d at 883 ("I am unaware of ever having
met or communicated with [the plaintiffs]. To the extent that these persons were on my
property... it was without my consent, permission or knowledge.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1563.
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interest in the shelters they erect or whether homeless persons
retain a property interest in shelters erected and property stored,
without permission, on private property.6
In the absence of such clear legal authority, the court elected to
hold that homeless trespassers forfeit their interest in their personal
property, and thus have no recourse when the police punitively
destroy everything they own without notice, a hearing, or
compensation. Apparently the right not to be deprived summarily
of one's earthly possessions-indeed, the right to have any earthly
possessions at all-becomes extremely abstract when one is
homeless .
At least in the Eleventh Circuit, this right may be as tenuous on
public property as it is on private land. In Church v. City of
Huntsville, a group of homeless plaintiffs challenged several
constitutional violations arising from an alleged municipal policy
"to drive them out of the city." 48  Conflicts arose when the City
suggested to the State Highway Department that it evict homeless
people living on state property under highway bridges and
overpasses. The Court distinguished between the City and the
State, finding that the highway department "was responsible for
removing the personal property and makeshift structures of the
homeless from under the bridges [and] for storing any personal
items taken from under the bridges." 49 According to the court, the
City's only role in the eviction operation was to provide police, who
kept peace at the eviction site but also "participated in the process of
determining which property should be destroyed as unsanitary, and
which property should be kept by the State to be reclaimed by the
bridge people.""0  This distinction, combined with evidence of
disagreement on the city council over proposals affecting the
homeless,51 led the Court to find that the "bridge people" had not
proven the existence of an official policy necessary for liability
under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court signaled that because the
plaintiffs had no right to be where they were, a municipal policy to
violate their rights could not logically exist:
46. D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 880, 881 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
omitted).
47. On other courts' willingness to recognize abstract property interests in other
contexts, specifically where such interests are held by large real estate developers, See
Part I.C., infra.
48. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d at 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 1344.
50. Id. at 1344-45 and n.6.
51. Id. at 1343 n.4.
52. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability arises
only where challenged actions are shown to be "official policy" of municipality.).
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Even if we were to impute to the City full responsibility for the
removal of the homeless and their property, we would still be
unable to agree that such action is indicative of a City policy to
violate the rights of the homeless. The Constitution does not
confer the right to trespass on public lands. Nor is there any
constitutional right to store one's personal belongings on public
lands. In this case, the property owner, the State of Alabama,
authorized the removal of the homeless and their belongings from
under the bridges and overpasses.53
This is a strange conclusion for a number of reasons, one of
which is the backward logic of the court's hypothetical. Assuming
that municipal liability could be shown, the court says it would still
decline to find the existence of an official policy. An official policy,
however, itself is the predicate for municipal liability under Section
1983."4 The court's real focus, as indicated in the quoted excerpt,
was on dictating that the homeless "bridge people" had no right at
all to be where they were, and thus no property interest in the
belongings seized by the City. Under this analysis, the State of
Alabama had as much right as any private landowner to exclude
homeless people from using state property and to have their
belongings seized and destroyed.
At least in the Eleventh Circuit, these decisions leave no place,
private or public, where homeless people can securely possess their
personal belongings. The logical result of this situation is that
homeless people, often possessing nothing but what they can carry
with them, are effectively denied the ability to exercise a legally
recognized property interest at all. The regulation of public and
private space defeats this basic ability, long considered a
fundamental civil right," and adds property ownership to the other
basic life activities that homeless people are fundamentally unfree to
perform. Homeless people, by virtue of the property relations that
define their existence, are thus entirely at the mercy of the state, and
unable to access the very provisions of the Bill of Rights that were
enacted to protect all citizens against abuses of state power.
Cases like Pottinger, D'Aguanno and Church demonstrate that
legally recognized ownership of personal property is all but
impossible without concomitant possession of some private space in
which to store and safeguard it. Furthermore, while there is still
some disagreement, most courts seem to find this constraint
constitutionally unproblematic despite its seemingly obvious
interference with basic notions of property, liberty, and
constitutional rights. In Jeremy Waldron's terms, homeless people
53. Id. at 1345.
54. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
55. See Part II, infra.
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are fundamentally "unfree" not only to perform basic life activities
necessary for survival, but also to avail themselves of individual
civil rights and liberties, like privacy itself, that are guaranteed by
the Constitution. Judicial ratification of municipal anti-homeless
policy represents the dystopian vision of the Founders come true:
without security in private property, the citizen stands unprotected
against abuses of state power.
2. Personal Property and Other Garbage
Judicial preconceptions and rhetorical conventions concerning
the nature of homeless people's property may also blind courts to
the constitutional implications of its seizure and destruction.16 If
municipal policy and judicial decision-making combine to deprive
homeless people of their ability to exercise property interests, their
putative belongings must logically assume a status below the rest of
the things in the world that are commonly thought of as property.
Indeed, in the pages of newspapers and judicial decisions alike,
homeless people's belongings often are represented as particularly
virulent forms of garbage, the existence of which threatens the
communities in which homeless people live.7
Many city policies on homelessness are motivated by concern
for its aesthetic impact on local businesses, tourism, shopping, and
other economic activity.58  Accordingly, homeless people are
rousted 9 and moved away from areas where they might mix with
tourists and professionals. Likewise, homeless people's belongings
often are treated as items that do not merit the respect generally
56. Cf. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court's "rhetoric of poverty" and its effect
on constitutional jurisprudence).
57. According to Harry Simon, judges and other officials often use "aesthetics" as a
code word for protecting citizens of one class from contact with another. Simon, supra
note 5, at 631, 659.
58. A recent article in the San Francisco Chronicle stated this concern very clearly:
"By the city's last count, there were some 2,000 people living on the streets ... acting
out, sleeping, eating, doing drugs, begging, performing all bodily functions, often in the
paths of those who would shop, do business, dine or be entertained in San Francisco."
Patrick Hoge, Squalor in the Streets: S.F. Spends More Than $200 Million a Year on
Homelessness, But Why Does the Problem Persist?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2001, at Al. The
article begins by describing an encounter between "horrified passers-by" and "a one-
legged drug addict, lying in his own vomit [and] naked from the waist down" who
"[a]wakened,. .. cursed bystanders, ate from a trash can, then urinated and gushed
diarrhea into the street. Then the 31-year-old, on probation for stealing a woman's purse,
rolled his wheelchair to a nearby intersection and begged money from aghast motorists
caught in traffic." The implication created by subsequent statistics-2,000 homeless on
the street, 70 percent of whom are "mentally ill or substance abusers or both"-is that
these are typical morning activities for a homeless person in San Francisco. Id.
59. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1346 (11th Cir. 1994).
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shown for personal property. For example, the City of San
Francisco has spent large sums of money over the past several years
to recover shopping carts-often full of personal belongings-from
homeless people.6 °  These belongings are often described by
journalists in the same terms used for homeless people themselves:
dirty, inappropriate, and aesthetically unpleasant. "Each month, the
city removes about 1,000 carts from the streets.... [Clity workers
pick through the often overflowing carts, removing hazardous
materials such as used syringes, crack pipes, bottles of urine and
clothing covered with bodily secretions."6  Such descriptions
illustrate the difficulty many people have in distinguishing
homeless people's property from abandoned, hazardous garbage.
Courts also struggle with this distinction. In the Pottinger
decision, the court rejected assertions by the City of Miami that
distinguishing property from garbage was impossible:
[H]omeless individuals often arrange their property in a manner
that suggests ownership, for example, by placing their belongings
against a tree or other object or by covering them with a pillow or
blanket. Such characteristics make the property of homeless
persons reasonably distinguishable from truly abandoned
property, such as paper refuse or other items scattered throughout
areas where plaintiffs reside.62
The court also rebuffed the City's argument that inventorying
and storing homeless people's property posed undue logistical
burdens, using terms that highlight the role of the owner's social
status in characterizations of property: "a homeless person's bedroll
should be no more difficult to handle than a picnic basket;
possessions that are contained in a plastic bag, box, or cloth bundle
should be no more burdensome to store or inventory than
possessions contained in a suitcase or a briefcase."63 These striking
comparisons between items often possessed by homeless people
60. The City estimates the cost of collecting, cleaning and storing the carts at
$650,000. Patrick Hoge, Carted Away: Removing Shopping Baskets from Streets Costs S.F.
Hundreds of Thousands-Plus Payments to Homeless, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 2001, at Al.
Lester Tobin planned to file a small claims action against the city for the loss and
destruction of personal property including two Persian rugs, a laptop computer, and
silverware; another homeless person was awarded a $1,000 settlement after a mountain
bike and several items of clothing were destroyed in a garbage compactor. Hoge, supra
note 60, at Al and A20.
61. Id. This lurid characterization of the carts' contents is belied by a full-color photo
accompanying the article, in which a large blanket and carefully folded sleeping bag are
shown amid a group of carts covered with blue tarps, apparently placed there by
homeless residents attempting to keep their possessions dry or signal a desire for
privacy usually associated with expressions of ownership.
62. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (internal
citation omitted).
63. Id. at 1573.
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(bedrolls and bundles) and items usually associated with more
bourgeois uses of urban public space (picnic baskets and briefcases)
clearly illustrate that class has tainted the ways in which city
officials treat different kinds of property.
Again, however, Pottinger seems to be unique in this regard.
Other courts explicitly conflate homeless people's belongings with
garbage. In Love v. City of Chicago,65 homeless residents challenged
the constitutionality of city actions that violated "Temporary
Procedures" for off-street cleanings in downtown Chicago's Lower
Wacker Drive area. These procedures required city sanitation
workers to notify homeless residents at least twice before cleaning
the area-once at least twelve hours, and again twenty minutes,
prior to cleaning-and allow them to move their belongings to a
safe area around the corner or across the street.66 A prior ruling in
the same litigation held that these procedures were reasonable and
protective of homeless people's interests.67  The parties found
themselves back in court following a December 1, 1997, cleaning in
which a large quantity of possessions were gathered up and
destroyed despite having been moved by their owners to a
designated safe zone.68
Before turning to the issues surrounding the December 1
cleaning, the court engaged in a lengthy and illustrative discussion
of the relationships between homeless people, their belongings, and
unsanitary conditions. The court noted the city's "right and
obligation to maintain its public ways in a clean, safe, obstruction-
free manner.... Unsanitary conditions can rapidly develop from
insects, human waste, and the presence of items that are not
systematically removed." 69 Here, homeless people's items are seen
as a source of pestilence equivalent to insects and human waste.
The court also observed that "plaintiffs' property is often stored and
maintained in unsanitary and unsafe conditions. Vermin, other
pests, and human waste are frequently found in the materials stored
by the homeless in the Lower Wacker Drive area. 7 For the court,
this situation was not the involuntary result of homeless people
having no secure place to store personal belongings, but rather was
the fault of the homeless themselves, most of whom were
64. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1468 (1996) (implying
that city workers' removal and destruction of several garbage bags full of homeless
people's belongings might have been "simple negligence" rather than city policy).
65. Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1998 WL 60804 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1998).
66. Id. at 1-2.
67. Id. at 5-6.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 6.
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"voluntarily choosing to live in the Lower Wacker Drive area.""
The December 1, 1997, cleaning occurred after the city issued a
construction permit for renovation of a building adjacent to Lower
Wacker Drive. As the court noted, "[t]he construction required the
sidewalks adjacent to this building on Lower Wacker Drive to be
boarded up. Consequently, the homeless living at this location were
required to relocate."72 Anticipating difficulties in evicting the
residents from the area, authorities ordered "an extra police
presence.'73 After removing items from sidewalk and median areas
outside the designated safe zone, city workers consulted with police
regarding belongings that had been moved to the safe zone, part of
a median strip in the "fork area," and "decided to discard items
stored in the safe areas at the fork even if the items were claimed or
attended. As a result, most Lower Wacker Drive residents lost all of
their possessions. A few residents lost items of special value such as
family photographs and Bibles. 74  The court approved of this
seizure and destruction of property despite the Temporary
Procedures, as officials "reasonably believed that the health and
safety hazards posed by the unprecedented accumulation of
belongings gresented an imminent danger requiring immediate
abatement."
The court also refused to require city workers to sort through
the property seized in order to locate items of value. Because of the
"unsanitary and unsafe conditions" in which the property was
stored, and the "vermin, human waste, and other pests" that were
"frequently found in the materials," the court held that "[p]laintiffs
have the burden to separate out and move items they find valuable
and wish to retain." 76 The court apparently failed to notice the irony
in this comment; the belongings at issue had been separated out and
moved, in accordance with the Temporary Procedures, indicating
that the plaintiffs did wish to retain them. More significant is the
degree to which unmistakably valuable personal property like
photographs and Bibles took on the taint of filth that the court
associated with the homeless residents and the Lower Wacker Drive
area.
Indeed, the court ultimately concluded that the dispossession of
homeless people in the area led to a general reduction in their
numbers, and was therefore a positive development overall.
According to the court, "[t]he events of that day resulted in a much
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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cleaner, safer Lower Wacker Drive and also precipitated an
immediate reduction from about fifty to about twenty homeless
people living there."77  The court went on to note that "[t]hose
plaintiffs dispossessed on December 1, 1997, have been offered-
and many have accepted-food, lodging, and job training from the
City at its expense. Frankly, the lives of some of the plaintiffs have,
by their own testimony, been upgraded. ,
78
While it may be true that some of the plaintiffs' property was
stored in unsanitary conditions, this was most likely the result of
their being homeless and having no secure, private place in which to
keep their possessions safe and clean. Yet the court sees
dispossession as both effective in removing homeless people from
the streets and therapeutic in terms of their lives, thus providing a
convenient rationalization for similar municipal policies. Basic
property rights often taken as given must be subordinated to both
the city's interest in clean, aesthetically pleasing environments and
the best interests of the homeless themselves, even if the property
interest is destroyed in the process.
B. Takings and Seizures: The Class Status of Property and the
Fifth Amendment
The seizure and destruction of homeless people's personal
belongings arguably implicate both the due process and just
compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment, although courts are
far from settled on how to approach such claims."0 Conversely,
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 14.
79. Although this section focuses primarily on the operation of the Takings Clause,
homeless people have also claimed less tangible property interests sufficient to implicate
due process concerns. For example, residents of municipal shelters in the District of
Columbia brought a series of due process challenges to proposed shelter closings.
Despite an early decision holding that shelter residents had a property interest in their
shelter space sufficient to implicate due process concerns, Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp.
941 (D.D.C. 1980), that case was reversed on appeal. Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Subsequent decisions have continued to deny a property interest. See
Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that amendment to the District's
municipal shelter legislation explicitly disclaimed creation of an entitlement to shelter);
Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting
argument that District's non-entitlement disclaimer was dispositive, yet holding that
discretion in the shelter space allocation process precluded creation of entitlement).
80. Compare, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1570 n.30 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (finding that taking and destruction of personal property violates the fifth
amendment) with Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1998 WL 60804, at *13 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 6, 1998) (restricting compensation to items "required to live on the sidewalk"); see
also D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1995) (denying Fifth
Amendment due process challenge because homeless plaintiffs had not shown that they
retained a property interest in personal belongings stored without permission on private
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although the doctrine is notoriously complex, courts have
developed far more predictable ways of recognizing and
compensating government interference with landowners',
investors', and developers' interests in land."' A comparison of the
different standards against which these various takings claims are
measured further illustrates the ways in which property is imbued
with notions of social class and status, and provides a framework in
which to understand the constitutional implications of homeless
property sweeps.
The difficulties some courts have had in recognizing seizure of
homeless people's property as a government taking might surprise a
lay observer. The seizure of personal belongings by the state would
seem to present an obvious and simple instance of a taking, in
contrast to the complex situations involving real property that have
contributed to the doctrine's notorious convolutions. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine a more clear physical invasion" than the
confiscation and destruction of all of one's worldly possessions by
authorities acting under color of law.
Perhaps reflecting such an intuitive insight, the court in
Pottinger assumed without much comment that the plaintiffs'
property had been "taken."83 Turning to the "public use" and "just
compensation" requirements of the Takings Clause, the court noted
that "public use" has been defined quite broadly: "the proper test is
whether 'exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose... it is only the taking's purpose,
and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
clause."'84  Under this analysis, "the fact that the city does not
actually use or possess the property taken from the homeless does
not mean that there is no 'public use,' and therefore no taking under
property).
81. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
82. "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
124).
83. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1570 n.30. One might object that the court's discussion
of the Takings Clause was only dicta, given that it appears in a footnote and was not
essential to the holding, which rested primarily on Fourth and Eighth Amendment
claims. Pottinger's discussion of takings issues is nonetheless indicative of how a
sympathetic court might analyze a Fifth Amendment claim.
84. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1570 n.30 (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 241, 244 (1984)).
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the Fifth Amendment."85 Although the court's discussion does not
elaborate on the "conceivable public purpose" for which the
homeless people's belongings were taken, it is clear from the rest of
the decision that the city's interest in "orderly, aesthetically pleasing
parks and streets" fills this role.86 In other words, the possessions of
Miami's homeless were taken for the public use of keeping the
streets and parks clean of unsightly people and their belongings.
Other courts, however, have approached the question quite
differently.87 The District Court's decision in Love v. City of Chicago
does not mention "public use" at all, instead focusing on whether
the plaintiffs had a recognized property interest at the time of
government action.88 Although the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim
as unripe because they had not sought compensation through city or
state procedures before filing suit, it did acknowledge that
"plaintiffs who place personal items in the safe areas during the
cleanings are entitled to compensation if the city takes those
items." The court's view of the nature of the property interest in
these belongings, however, was closely connected to its assumptions
about the homelessness of their owners.
The decision expresses consternation at the "unprecedented
amount of possessions" accumulated by homeless residents in the
area following charity donations during the Thanksgiving holiday,
including "many items besides those necessary for life on Lower
Wacker Drive.""9  The degree to which the homeless residents'
possessions were mixed in with "vermin, other pests and human
waste" also deeply disturbed the court. Accordingly, the court
dramatically qualified its finding that the city "should reimburse
plaintiffs for the loss of items taken by the city from the safe areas"
by holding that "the right to compensation is not absolute." 91 First,
the court held that "the City should not be compelled to reimburse
plaintiffs for possessions that were mingled with filthy or improper
items that posed a hazard to pedestrians or vehicles, such as
furniture, cardboard boxes, or extra mattresses."92 Carrying this
notion of "improper items" one step further, the court concluded
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1554.
87. At the other extreme from Pottinger, the D'Aguanno decisions questioned whether
the homeless people retain any property interest in their belongings whatsoever because
of their status as trespassers; compensation for their lost possessions thus never became
an issue. See D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 827 F. Supp. at 1562-63; D'Aguanno v. Gallagher,
50 F.3d at 881.
88. 1998 WL 60804 at 10.
89. Id.
90. Id at 5.
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id.
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that plaintiffs could only be compensated for "the basic items, such
as a sleeping bag and several blankets, required to live on the
sidewalk. 93  Finally, the court noted that although clothing,
bedding, and other such possessions "can be readily valued or
replaced . .. a few plaintiffs lost irreplaceable items, such as
photographs or Bibles, that cannot be easily valued. Plaintiffs,
however, assumed a risk of loss by choosing to leave the items in the
Lower Wacker Drive area instead of with friends or relatives for
safekeeping."94
In a remarkable series of steps, nearly all of which cited no
precedential authority,95 the court so narrowly circumscribed the
property interests of the homeless plaintiffs that it left them with
almost nothing to own. The loss of personal items mixed in with
sleeping bags [or] blankets would not be compensated because city
workers could not be expected to sort through the possessions
seized. On the other hand, the taking of all other personal
belongings besides sleeping bags and blankets would not be
compensated because these items were deemed unnecessary for life
on the sidewalk. 96 Most remarkably, irreplaceable personal items
would not merit compensation because plaintiffs had "assumed the
risk of loss" by failing to leave these items in a secure, private space.
The court does not examine its assumption that all homeless people
have friends or relatives with whom they can safely leave their most
precious possessions while "choosing" to live out their lives in
places like Lower Wacker Drive.97 By identifying the nature of the
plaintiffs' property interest as the relevant inquiry, then qualifying
that interest so severely that almost nothing remained, the court not
only limited the city's liability to sleeping bags and blankets but also
straitjacketed homeless people's basic freedom to own and control
personal property.
93. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 12 (emphasis supplied).
95. The court cited nothing in support of its determinations that neither personal
items mixed in with other items nor items unnecessary for life on the sidewalks
deserved compensation. In support of its creative application of the "assumption of the
risk" doctrine, the court cites McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1997).
McKenzie says nothing about "assumption of the risk," but rather concerns a court's
refusal to enjoin demolition of a building based on emotional harm to the owners where
monetary compensation was available. Id. at 556. The Love opinion, on the other hand,
denies compensation altogether for the items to which the homeless plaintiffs felt the
greatest emotional attachment. In this respect, the McKenzie opinion actually would
support an argumentfor monetary compensation.
96. Cf. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing conflicting racial and class
biases about the "necessity" of "Sunday shoes" purchased by an African-American
welfare recipient for her daughters).
97. See Love, 1998 WL 60804 at 6, 12.
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The ease with which courts abrogate homeless people's
property interests seems especially stark in comparison to the ways
in which courts often go out of their way to defer to even the most
abstract interests of real property owners. Indeed, if courts were to
apply the standards often used in real property cases to claims
brought by the dispossessed homeless, the results might be
surprising. One notable recent takings case-in which homelessness
played an ironically important role-illustrates this dichotomy.
In Seawall Associates v. City of New York,98 a group of property
owners brought a facial challenge to an ordinance that restricted the
demolition, conversion, and alteration of single-room occupancy
("SRO") hotels. The ordinance imposed a five-year renewable
moratorium on "conversion, alteration and demolition of SRO
multiple dwellings," required owners to "rent-up" or "rehabilitate
and make available every SRO unit in their buildings, and lease
every unit to a 'bona fide' tenant at controlled rents," and imposed
substantial fines for violating either of these requirements.9  The
ordinance also contained a provision allowing owners to purchase
an exemption from the moratorium by either paying for or creating
"an equal number of replacement units" and a "hardship
exemption" for owners whose property returned less than eight and
one-half percent of assessed value annually. ' The city's stated aim
in passing the ordinance was to address withdrawal of SRO units
from the rental market that, according to the city council,
"contributed to the increasing homeless population." 101
The Court of Appeals, siding with the SRO owners, found that
the ordinance on its face constituted both a physical and a
regulatory taking of their property. In framing the issue, the Court
chose to focus on "whether the uncompensated obligations and
restrictions imposed by the governmental action force individual
property owners to bear more than a just share of obligations which
are rightfully those of society at large." ' 2 The Court determined that
the ordinance, by preventing owners from converting the SROs and
requiring them to keep the buildings fully rented, "impose[d] on the
property owners more than their just share of such societal
98. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
99. Id. at 1061.
100. Id. at 1061-62.
101. See id. at 1073 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), quoting Local Laws, 1985, No. 59 of City
of New York § 1 and Local Laws, 1986, No. 22 of City of New York § 1. This approach
represented a shift in New York's previous policy of encouraging the demolition and
conversion of SROs, brought on by the city's realization that its policy had a "staggering
impact on the homeless population." Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1073 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at 1062.
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obligations."1 3
One remarkable aspect of the Seawall case is its extension of the
"physical invasion" doctrine from actual real property itself to the
abstract "bundle" of classical property rights.
Whether the mandatory 'rent-up' obligations of the
antiwarehousing provision effect a physical taking depends upon
the nature and extent of their interference with certain essential property
rights.... Where, as here, owners are forced to accept the
occupation of their properties by persons not already in residence,
the resulting deprivation of rights in those properties is sufficient to
constitute a physical taking for which compensation is required."0 '
For the Court, the ordinance itself-by requiring property
owners to maintain, renovate, and rent out their rooms to tenants
for at least five years-invaded the owners' interest in exclusion, if
not their actual property. "Although the Supreme Court has not
passed upon the specific issue of whether the loss of possessory
interests, including the right to exclude, resulting from tenancies
coerced by the government would constitute a physical taking, we
believe that it would. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such forced
occupancy of one's property could not do so." '16 This deference to a
prospective real estate developer's largely theoretical property
interest stands in marked contrast to other courts' findings that
homeless people's immediate and tangible property interests are too
abstract for recognition (D'Aguanno) or in need of radical
circumscription (Love).
The Court of Appeals applied a similar analysis in finding that
the ordinance worked a regulatory taking. Observing that the
government may regulate the use of private property under its
103. Id.
104. "Under the traditional conception of property, the most important of the various
rights of an owner is the right of possession which includes the right to exclude others
from occupying or using the space.... This right to exclude has traditionally been
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."
Id. at 1063 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982)).
105. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1062-63 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1064. The Court analogized to cases where a state agency's requirement of a
dedicated easement as a condition for a building permit, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm.,
483 U.S. 825 (1987), and the federal government's imposition of a navigational servitude
allowing public access to a privately owned marina, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979), were found to authorize physical invasions by third parties. Seawall, 542
N.E.2d at 1063. The decision also distinguished cases in which rent control ordinances
and other landlord-tenant regulations were upheld against taking challenges, finding
that such regulations "merely involved restrictions imposed on existing tenancies where
the landlords had voluntarily put their properties to use for residential housing ....
[T]hose regulations did not force the owners, in the first instance, to subject their
properties to a use which they neither planned nor desired." Id. at 1064-65.
Fall 20031 "OFFICER, WHERE'S MY STUFF?"
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
police power, the Court noted that such regulations will nonetheless
require compensation when they force certain people to bear
burdens that should more fairly be borne by the public as a whole. °7
According to the Court, the test for whether such a regulation
constitutes a taking is twofold: "such a burden-shifting regulation of
the use of private property will, without more, constitute a taking:
(1) if it denies an owner economically viable use of his property, or
(2) if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." 08
With respect to the first prong of this test, the Court found that
the "mandatory rental provisions-together with the prohibition
against demolition, alteration and conversion of the properties to
other uses, and the requirement that uninhabitable units be
refurbished-deny owners of SRO buildings any right to use their
properties as they see fit.""' 9  The Court also decided that the
ordinance impaired the ability of owners to sell their properties "for
any sums approaching their investments" and therefore "must also
negatively affect the owners' right to dispose of their properties.""1 '
The Court went on to conclude that abrogation of these "valuable
components of the 'bundle of rights' making up their fee interests"
deprived the owners of economically viable use of their property."'
The ordinance also failed the second prong of the Court's
regulatory takings test. Although "the end sought to be furthered
by [the ordinance] is of the greatest importance-alleviating the
critical problems of homelessness," the Court found that the
ordinance would not substantially advance this aim."' In a
somewhat Kafkaesque twist, the court noted that "the SRO units are
not earmarked for the homeless or for potentially homeless low-
income families, and there is simply no assurance that the units will
be rented to members of either group.""' 3 This observation allowed
the Court to conclude that:
[The] nexus between the obligations placed on SRO property
owners and the alleviation of the highly complex social problem
of homelessness is indirect at best and conjectural. Such a tenuous
connection between means and ends cannot justify singling out
this group of property owners to bear the costs required by the
law toward the cure of the homeless problem."" 4
107. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1065.
108. Id. (emphasis in original).
109. Id. at 1066 (emphasis in original).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1068.
113. Id. Of course, an ordinance forcing the owners not only to rent their units, but to
rent them to members of a particular group of citizens, would certainly flunk the Court's
"physical invasion" test.
114. Id. at 1069.
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Seawall certainly represents an extreme application of the
Takings Clause in its abstract, formalist analysis of property
interests."5 This formalist approach, however, combined with the
ways in which the case is implicated in municipal efforts to address
homelessness, presents an interesting thought experiment: What if a
court were to apply Seawall's logic in a case where homeless
residents challenged a city policy allowing the seizure of their
personal belongings? First, there could be no doubt that the policy
would work a physical invasion of the plaintiffs' property; seizure
and destruction of property present nearly the paradigmatic case of
such invasion. Under Seawall's formalist analysis, however, the
rights to possess, exclude others from possessing, dispose of and use
whatever the plaintiffs owned could not be abrogated. This might
mean that the decision in Love, instead of determining that homeless
people could not be compensated for the non-necessary items they
had lost, would instead have enjoined the city from removing and
destroying any of the sofas, computers, or extra mattresses without
compensation. The D'Aguanno court, had it brought such analysis
to bear on the case of the homeless trespassers, would have had far
less trouble locating a property interest in the makeshift shelters and
personal possessions that the plaintiffs in that case kept with them;
in other words, the abstractness of the property interest would not
have bothered the court.
Second, to the extent that a municipal policy is similar enough
to an ordinance to face a facial challenge, the city's policy would
nonetheless fail Seawall's two-prong test for a regulatory taking.
Dispossession certainly limits the economically viable use of the
owner's property, along with all other uses. Furthermore, because
the link between seizure of homeless people's belongings and the
city's interest in clean parks and streets is at least as indirect,
conjectural, and tenuous as the relationship between SRO
conversion and increased homelessness, the city would have a
difficult time showing that the policy substantially advanced
legitimate state interests.
Finally, the policy certainly would require a specific class of
115. The dissent in Seawall compared the majority's opinion to Lochner in its elevation
of a single property theory to constitutional significance. Id. at 1072. At least one
commentator has agreed with this comparison. See John A. Saurenman, Keystone, Nollan
and First English Three Years Later: How Fare the States?, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L.
115, 137 (1990). Seawall does have its fans, however, at least one of whom has attempted
to federalize its reasoning. A 1993 decision from the Northern District of California
lifted whole paragraphs from the Seawall opinion, often without citation, in finding that
a similar ordinance adopted by the City and County of San Francisco constituted both a
physical and a regulatory taking of SRO owners' property. Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v.
City and County of San Francisco, 864 F. Supp. 917 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd and vacated on
other grounds, 18 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1994).
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individual property owners to bear more than their fair share of
"obligations which are rightfully those of society at large."116 As the
decisions in Love, Pottinger, and Church pointed out, seizure and
destruction of a homeless person's property commonly results in
loss of everything that the person owns. Complete dispossession is
of much greater and more immediate significance than, for instance,
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations or
infringement on certain economically viable uses of property.
Forcing the homeless to bear the burden of the city's interest in clean
streets and parks is doubly unfair because they themselves are
viewed by many cities as the very blight that dispossession policies
aim to abate. In other words, they must bear the burden of
dispossession in order to advance the municipality's interest in their
ultimate removal.
Although such an experiment may seem frivolous on its
surface, 7 it does shed special light on the ways in which courts treat
different classes of property-and different classes of owners-very
differently when a government taking is involved. When an owner
is weak and impoverished with respect to society as a whole, courts
seem to view her ability to own property as equally weak and
attenuated and therefore to tolerate invasions of her property
interests to a very significant degree. Where she controls real estate
investments, on the other hand, some courts appear willing to
acknowledge not only tangible but also highly abstract property
interests, and to view government interference with those interests
with far greater scrutiny.
This thought experiment demonstrates not only how different
types of property and classes of owners receive different legal
treatment, but also how the categories of real property and personal
belongings do not easily lend themselves to the same kind of takings
analysis. Real property is subject to official regulation in ways that
personal property is not. From county zoning ordinances to the
federal Endangered Species Act, legislation at all levels defines the
boundaries of property rights, and takings doctrine has responded
accordingly. Such legislation, however, is often adopted through
political processes to which landowners have (often privileged)
access, and can also be challenged through the kinds of facial
constitutional claims advanced by the SRO owners in Seawall.
Municipal policies targeting the possessions of the homeless, on the
other hand, rarely if ever take the form of official legislation, and
116. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1062.
117. The many dangers of Seawall's exceedingly formal analysis of property interests
should caution against its extension to other contexts. See Section III, Parts A and B,
infra.
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courts view claims challenging unofficial policies with a great
degree of skepticism. These differences illustrate a certain irony of
property ownership with respect to government intervention.
Although the kinds of interests embodied in real property are
complex and officially circumscribed, the procedures for
challenging such circumscription are relatively straightforward and
the doctrines controlling government interference with these
interests are well-developed. In contrast, the property interest in
one's personal belongings seems relatively simple, but the
procedures for challenging policies that deprive people of that
interest are unclear, and a unified takings doctrine has not yet
emerged.
C. A Property Disability in Policy and Precedent
The municipal policies discussed in this section, and the courts'
varying responses to civil rights challenges, work together to create
a de facto property disability-in the sense of a legally created and
judicially enforced proscription against basic rights of property
ownership-for homeless people. The lack of private space exposes
homeless people to arbitrary and unpredictable abuses of state
power. Municipal efforts to eradicate homelessness create a basic
lack of a legal place for the homeless to be, which in turn impinges
severely on homeless people's ability to securely possess and control
their personal property. When homeless people have contested
these seizures, the courts have gone even further, either refusing to
recognize that homeless people exercise any property interest
whatsoever or limiting those interests in uniquely restrictive ways.
Popular and juridical accounts of homelessness use a rhetoric of
criminality, filth, and contagion that equates personal belongings
with garbage and people with vermin. According to such accounts,
any property interest retained by a homeless person in her personal
effects is at best abstract and at worst nonexistent. Lack of
defensible space coupled with municipal policies of dispossession
and judicial derecognition of property interests combine to create a
property disability: a situation in which homeless people lack the
basic ability to possess property.
A comparison with juridical treatments of other kinds of
property throws this disability into even sharper relief. Courts are
willing to recognize abstract and formal property interests held by
real estate developers and other landowners in the context of
Takings Clause challenges. Seawall pointedly demonstrates that
landowners may not be required to bear the burden of social efforts
to redress homelessness when these efforts infringe on their abstract
property rights. Conversely, the homeless can be forced to bear the
burden of their own displacement; courts' refusal to recognize
Fall 20031 "OFFICER, WHERE'S MY STUFF?"
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
homeless people's personal belongings as property helps rationalize
dispossession without compensation or other legal recourse. If
homeless people cannot exercise property interests, the law need not
trouble itself about the consequences of municipal dispossession
policies.
The creation of a property disability for a specific, marginalized
class of Americans should greatly trouble a legal system predicated
on liberal individuality and civic republican political participation.
Property disabilities have functioned throughout American history
to mark and subordinate groups of people considered less than fully
human by dominant social ideology as reflected in law.'8 American
legal and social history have also been shaped by philosophical,
political, and juridical efforts to abolish property disabilities and
other indicators of de jure subordinate status, and to extend special
constitutional protection to the individuals and groups who have
labored under sub-person classifications. The political and
philosophical implications of this development may point to a set of
constitutional remedies that can help restore homeless individuals
to equal status in American law and society.
II. Constitutional Objections to Property Disabilities
The previous section established that municipal policies of
criminalization and dispossession, as construed by most reviewing
courts, have imposed a property disability on homeless people. The
question remains, however, whether such a property disability
implicates constitutional concerns.
One possible answer to this question lies in the historical
context of the Reconstruction Amendments and the early Civil
Rights Acts. The Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress power
to abolish the "badges and incidents" of slavery, 9 one of which was
the inability of slaves to own property. ° Under the Black Codes
enacted after the Civil War, many freed African Americans
118. See Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 56 (1998) ("Until emancipation, the overwhelming majority
of African Americans were enslaved and treated as property, not citizens or immigrants
eligible for citizenship. Therefore, they could not own property and had no legal title to
anything they acquired.").
119. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) ("Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges
and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
effective legislation.").
120. See THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 235 (U. of Georgia Press 1999) (1858) ("Of the other great
absolute right of a freeman, viz., the right of private property, the slave is entirely
deprived.").
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continued to suffer restrictions on the free exercise of property
rights.12' The 1866 Civil Rights Act, adopted by Congress for this
very purpose, explicitly abolished property disabilities.22
Furthermore, many commentators, and one recent Supreme Court
case, suggest that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment may offer some substantive protection for
citizens' rights, including a right to property. Finally, property-
related civic republican arguments advanced during the
Reconstruction era and thereafter are consistent with the principles
reflected in the drafting and ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments. Indeed, close attention to the moral and
philosophical context of Reconstruction reveals that the property
disability currently imposed on homeless people is at the very least
constitutionally troubling, and quite possibly unconstitutional.
A. Citizens' Rights in the Rhetoric of Reconstruction
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution were adopted during a time of great moral and
political crisis in the United States. The process of drafting,
proposing, and ratifying these amendments-especially the
Fourteenth-was both politically and rhetorically complex, drawing
on a web of competing accounts of natural law, citizens' rights,
equality, and state sovereignty. 23 With respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment, this process resulted in textual ambiguities that have
perplexed courts and commentators to this day.24 In a recent
121. Although many of the Black Codes lifted the total property disability that had
been imposed on former slaves, they also instituted restrictions on tenancy that left
African Americans unable to lease farm land. See Paul Finkelman, "Let Justice Be Done,
Though the Heavens May Fall": The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 325, 354-56
(1994); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 199-201 (1988) (describing how Black Codes forced former slaves into contract
labor that resembled conditions of slavery).
122. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
123. See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988). Nelson
attempts to address an impasse in Fourteenth Amendment scholarship by looking
beyond the record of congressional debate to other primary source materials that
provide a more robust account of the rhetoric, morality, and philosophy underlying the
vague text of the Amendment, and asking new questions about the Amendment's
meaning rather than speculating on whether the framers of the Amendment intended its
provisions to address contemporary questions, such as the right to abortion, that they
never could have anticipated. Id. at 5-6. Akhil Reed Amar also recently has analyzed the
historical and rhetorical context surrounding the Amendment's adoption, although his
analysis is directed primarily to whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
provisions of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states. See AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 137ff. (1998).
124. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1387 n.5 (1992) (noting the standard view, advanced by Judge Robert H. Bork,
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historical treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment, William Nelson
cautions that the "vagueness and ambiguity of section one's
language and the failure of the framing generation to settle how it
would apply to a variety of specific issues should not lead those
who must interpret [it] to conclude that the section has no
meaning."'25 Nelson argues instead that the Amendment's meaning
lies in "[w]hat was politically essential" for the North to accomplish
following the Civil War: that its victory "be rendered permanent
and the principles for which the war had been fought rendered
secure, so that the South... could not undo them." 26 In this light,
Nelson finds nothing odd in the failure of proponents to resolve
specific legal issues. Indeed, one should expect the debates about
section one to be cast in terms of the moralistic libertarian and
egalitarian rhetoric through which the supporters of the
Amendment had attained national political power, and for which
they had fought and won the war.'2 7
This rhetoric encompassed often overlapping "principles of
higher law, citizens' rights, and equality.' 128  Higher law ideals
deriving from religious and abolitionist conceptions of natural
rights permeated the rhetoric surrounding the debates.'29 Notions of
rights belonging by definition to the citizens of free governments
found their way into newspaper editorials, constituents' letters, and
statements of congressional representatives.' The content of these
citizens' rights was not specified, Nelson argues, because "the
vagueness of the concept gave it greater power in the hands of
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, who, by promising to
protect rights, offered to many Union citizens federal support for
whichever ones they "valued most. ' ' 3' Finally, the Fourteenth
Amendment's proponents, including one of its primary drafters,
John A. Bingham, drew higher law and citizen's rights together
under the rubric of "the right of supreme importance to their
generation-the right of equality., 132 In this sense, the historical
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's text is best characterized
as broad, moral, philosophical, and general rather than specific and
prescriptive.
that the Amendment's Privileges or Immunities clause "has been a mystery since its
adoption.").
125. NELSON, supra note 123, at 61.
126. Id. at 61.
127. Id. at 62.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 64-67.
130. Id. at 67-71.
131. Id. at 71.
132. Id. at 72.
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Nelson argues that the Reconstruction debates refined and
clarified these principles in applying them to a pro-Fourteenth
Amendment political position. " Through this process, the
principles began to take on a more legalistic, doctrinal character,
although determining their ultimate meaning was left to the courts:
The debates on the Fourteenth Amendment were, in essence,
debates about high politics and fundamental principles-about
the future course and meaning of the American nation. The
debates by themselves did not reduce the vague, open-ended, and
sometimes clashing principles used by the debaters to precise,
carefully bounded legal doctrine. That would be the task of the
courts once the Fourteenth Amendment, having been enacted into
law, was given over to them to reconcile its ambiguities and its
conflicting meanings.'
The historical context surrounding the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments thus can be seen as one in which
rhetoricians invoked broad moral principles in response to thorny
political and moral questions. It is beyond dispute that the status of
former slaves, the establishment of national citizenship, and the
empowerment of Congress to address violations of citizens' rights
were the guiding historical questions facing the Reconstruction
generation. The principles they invoked in framing their response
to these questions, however, were of a general moral and
philosophical character, rooted in a conflation of the natural rights
belonging to all human beings and the civil rights belonging to all
citizens, and a unification of these principles under a broad rubric of
equality. The expansiveness of the Reconstruction Amendments'
guiding principles necessarily confronts courts with the difficult
task of applying them to situations that the Amendments' framers
did not and could not choose to resolve.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Cases, and
Property Disabilities
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary
servitude in the United States, and granted Congress the power to
enact legislation necessary to execute the Amendment's
prohibitions.' While the Thirteenth Amendment itself does not
133. Id. at 62.
134. Id. at 62-63.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The text of the Thirteenth Amendment reads:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
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mention property, the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases
136
made an explicit connection between state-imposed property
disabilities and the forms of subordination the amendment was
created to abolish. Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley held
that the enforcement power granted Congress under both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was "corrective" in nature,
and thus limited to addressing instances of existing state
discrimination.37 Justice Bradley identified the "disability to hold
property" as one of the "inseparable incidents" of slavery that the
Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to correct.
13
1
Justice Bradley cited the 1866 Civil Rights Act as an example of
such corrective legislation. 39 Section One of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 secured to all citizens the right "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property,
as is enjoyed by white citizens. . The 1866 Civil Rights Act in
both its original and subsequent amended forms were certainly
intended to override racially discriminatory laws, like the Black
Codes, adopted by Southern states almost immediately following
emancipation. The statute's prohibition against property
disabilities cannot easily be construed to apply to homeless
people.'42 Justice Bradley's characterization of the Civil Rights Act's
broader purpose-to "secure to all citizens of every race and
color... those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,"
including specifically the rights to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and
convey property' 4 -is nonetheless instructive. Here, Justice
Bradley does not rely on a narrow conception of rights, applicable
only in a certain historical context, but rather invokes the same
broad moral and philosophical principles that gave the
Reconstruction Amendments their political and moral force. 44
136. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
137. See id. at 13-14 (Fourteenth Amendment) and 21 (Thirteenth Amendment). This
conclusion supported Bradley's much-criticized determination that the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, which prohibited race discrimination in access to public accommodations,
exceeded Congress's authority because the discrimination at issue was "private" and
"social" rather than a function of state law. See id. at 25-26.
138. Id. at 22.
139. Id.
140. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (quoted in Harrison, supra note 124, at
1404-1405). These provisions, in slightly different form, are currently codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982.
141. See Harrison, supra note 124, at 1402 (quoting the bill's author, Senator Lyman
Trumbull).
142. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (holding that §
1982 "deals only with racial discrimination").
143. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 (emphasis supplied).
144. See text accompanying notes 123-34, supra.
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Under this historical reading of the Reconstruction Amendments, a
property disability visited on any American citizen-including a
homeless person-should be constitutionally troubling.
C. Privileges, Immunities, and Property
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, among other
things, prevents states from making or enforcing any law that
abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.14' This Privileges or Immunities Clause has been considered
something of a dead letter 146 since the Supreme Court first
interpreted away much of its content in the Slaughter-House Cases.147
Writing for the majority, Justice Miller distinguished state from
national citizenship148 and held that the privileges or immunities
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the
fundamental rights of state citizenship.4 9 According to Justice
Miller, the rights derived from state citizenship were the
fundamental rights of life, liberty, and happiness, including "the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind."'5 0 The
privileges or immunities incident to national citizenship, on the
other hand, included the right to "come to the seat of government"
and transact business with it, the right to the "care and protection of
the Federal government" when on the high seas or in a foreign
country, the right to take up residence in any state and obtain the
benefits of state citizenship, and the right to use the navigable
waters of the United States.' Thus the Slaughter-House Cases left
most of the important rights of citizens in the hands of the states,'
and deprived the newly-created national citizenship notion of much
of its substantive potential.
Dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases also relied on
notions of citizens' basic rights, but did not subsume those rights
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The section reads in full:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
146. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 124, at 1387 ("No important line of decision rests on
the clause; every student of constitutional law quickly learns that it was virtually read
out of the document by the Slaughter-House Cases.")
147. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
148. Id. at 73.
149. Id. at 74.
150. Id. at 76 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (Cir. Pa. 1823)).
151. Id. at 79-80 (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867)).
152. See id. at 82.
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exclusively under the rubric of state citizenship.15 3 Justice Bradley
expressed this notion most forcefully:
In this free country, the people of which inherited certain
traditionary rights and privileges from their ancestors, citizenship
means something. It has certain privileges and immunities
attached to it which the government, whether restricted by
express or implied limitations, cannot take away or impair. It
may do so temporarily by force, but it cannot do so by right. And
these privileges and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the
United States as to citizenship of the States.1
4
Later commentators also have criticized Justice Miller's opinion
as out of step with the principles of natural rights and citizens'
rights that surrounded adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
5
and have argued for reinvesting the amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause with various kinds of content.'56
Signaling a possible willingness to revive the clause, the United
States Supreme Court recently struck down a California law
imposing residency requirements on recipients of welfare benefits
on the ground that the law infringed on the "right to travel," one of
the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'57 Although this decision may signal new potential for
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to provide a basis for federal
limits on state action, at least one caveat is in order. Justice Stevens'
opinion for the majority relied on a citizen's right to equal benefits
of citizenship in any state in which she might take up residence, a
notion common to both the majority and the dissenting opinions in
153. See id. at 91 (Field, J., dissenting) (observing that the rights enumerated in the
1866 Civil Rights Act, including property rights, were intended to be rights of all
"citizens of the United States as such.").
154. Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
155. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 123, at 163 (calling Miller's opinion "flatly
inconsistent with the history of the framing in Congress and its ratification by the state
legislatures .... [Slection one [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was designed to put to
rest any doubt about the power of the federal government to protect basic common law
rights of property and contract.").
156. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death:
The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1071 (2000)
(arguing that the clause incorporates the provisions of the Bill of Rights and applies
them to the states); Harrison, supra note 124; Daniel J. Levin, Reading the Privileges or
Immunities Clause: Textual Irony, Analytical Revisionism, and an Interpretive Truce, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569 (2000) (suggesting that "the clause constitutionalizes various
privileges of civil and political participation"); William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities:
The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional Power to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2001) (arguing that the clause "changed federal
and state relationships in order to protect future generations from state interference with
privileges or immunities established by either the Constitution or laws of the national
government").
157. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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the Slaughter-House Cases."' In this sense, Saenz adds nothing to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause that Justice Miller would have
found objectionable. Nonetheless, Saenz marks the first time in
more than sixty years that the Supreme Court relied upon the
Clause in striking down state legislation,"9 inviting a reexamination
of the Clause and the content of the national citizenship created by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
John Harrison, engaging in a historical analysis influenced by
William Nelson,6 ' has advanced a reinterpretation of the Clause that
may be useful in challenging property disabilities visited upon
homeless people. Under Harrison's "interstate comity reading" of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause found in the text of the
Constitution itself, 6' "the privileges and immunities of citizens are
their rights under state law."' More specifically, these "privileges
and immunities constitute a substantial part of the content of a
state's law, especially its basic law of private civil capacity, such as
the right to make contracts and own property."'63 Harrison contends
that "Justice Miller was wrong" in assuming that:
[T]he clause protects a class of rights-the Privileges or
Immunities of citizens of the United States, rather than a group of
people-the citizens of the United States, whose privileges and
immunities may not be abridged.... If the Constitution says that
a state may not abridge the privileges or immunities of a
particular group of citizens, then the state may not abridge any of
that group's privileges or immunities, no matter which citizenship
those rights are associated with.'
Thus Harrison concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not separate the rights of state and national citizenship, but rather
"staple[d] them together"'65 in conferring both kinds of citizenship
on all Americans. In this sense, the privileges and immunities of
state citizenship, including the "private law rights of property
ownership, contractual capacity, and personal security, and access
to governmental mechanisms that protect those primary rights,'
'1 66
were converted also into rights of national citizenship by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
158. Id. at 503-04.
159. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
160. Harrison, supra note 124, at 1385 n.d.
161. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
162. Harrison, supra note 124, at 1400 n.48.
163. Id. at 1401.
164. Id. at 1414.
165. Id. at 1415.
166. Id. at 1416. Harrison sees congruency between the Fourteenth Amendment's
privileges or immunities and the basic civil rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights
Act.
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Critical to Harrison's argument is the distinction between
creation and equal enforcement of the fundamental rights evoked by
the clause. Harrison's interpretation does not entirely upset Justice
Miller's observation that fundamental citizens' rights of property
and contract were created by state law, but rather reads the
Fourteenth Amendment as "including positive law rights of state
citizenship within the scope of the privileges and immunities of
citizens.""6 The clause does not create new rights for citizens per se,
but rather recognizes the fundamental rights that all citizens are
presumed to possess, and explicitly prohibits states from abridging
those rights. Harrison understands this prohibition by reference to
the "equality principle" that animated debate on the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. Advocates of the Civil
Rights Act argued that "[t]he states would remain free to create
whate .er rights they pleased, as long as they gave them to all
citizens."168 Under this analysis, state citizens were presumed to
have certain fundamental rights; the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated these fundamental rights into the baseline of national
citizenship and prohibited states from allocating them unequally
among their citizens. In Harrison's account, the right to "inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property" is
one of the "privileges or immunities" that a state may not deny to its
citizens on an unequal basis. 69
Harrison's reinterpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a source of substantive, fundamental rights calls for a
reexamination of the Equal Protection Clause. For Harrison, the
Slaughter-House Cases shifted the constitutional locus of federal civil
rights to the Equal Protection Clause, as evidenced by the
arguments of proponents of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. 17' These
arguments, according to Harrison, stretched the boundaries of equal
protection beyond what the text intended. Harrison would read
"equal protection of the laws" to mean not "equality with respect to
everything,'71 but rather equality in the "protection of the laws"
itself, which in nineteenth-century usage "referred to the
mechanisms through which the government secured individuals
and their rights against invasion by others." 17 2 The Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause thus overlap,
with the Privileges or Immunities Clause constitutionalizing various
167. Id. at 1424.
168. Id. at 1403. This observation squares nicely with Justice Stevens' rationale in
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503-04.
169. Id. at 1424.
170. Harrison, supra note 124, at 1430.
171. Id. at 1434.
172. Id. at 1435.
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fundamental rights that states could not deny to certain classes of
their citizens, and the Equal Protection Clause mandating equal
access to government procedures for defending and enforcing those
rights.
Harrison's view, if accepted, would require a fundamental
revision in equal protection and due process jurisprudence. He also
reaches some uncomfortable conclusions. For instance, while equal
protection is available to all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States, privileges and immunities are available only to
citizens,'73 meaning that a state could impose a property disability
on noncitizens."4 Whatever the merits or dangers of his broader
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, Harrison's conclusions
nonetheless support the argument that a state would violate the
Privileges or Immunities Clause by imposing a property disability
on a certain class of citizens.
D. Property, Citizenship, and the "Neo-Republican Synthesis"
The Reconstruction Amendments drew on a broad discourse of
fundamental rights in redefining and extending American
citizenship. There are strong parallels between the rights for which
Republicans sought protection during the debates on passage of the
Reconstruction Amendments and early Civil Rights Acts, and the
rights essential to the exercise of citizenship in traditional civic
republican theory. Property rights are central to both conceptions.
Phyliss Craig-Taylor has analyzed the historical relationships
and tensions among property, individuality, and citizenship in
republican theory.' In the European republican tradition,
"ownership of productive property and the protection of property
rights play a central role" in defining citizenship. 76 According to
Craig-Taylor, American republican theorists were split as to
whether this essential concept required guaranteeing citizens the
right to acquire property, "ensuring an equality of condition and
stabilizing the property ownership patterns that had been
established," or "ensuring minimal universal access to the
ownership of productive property to all citizens.' ' 17   Indeed,
"property was the integral link to liberty of action and freedom, for
173. See id. at 1442-44. Harrison sees this distinction carried forward into the
difference between 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which applies the equal protection of the laws to all
persons, and § 1982, which protects the property rights of citizens.
174. Harrison, supra note 124, at 1442.
175. Craig-Taylor, supra note 118.
176. Id. at 47.
177. Thomas Jefferson espoused the latter view in a proposed draft of the Virginia
Constitution that would have ensured a minimum allotment of 50 acres of land to
"[e]very person of full age." Id. at 48.
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without it, one could be subject to control or manipulation. This
belief in the role of property fueled advocacy for a wide distribution
of property."178
Various forms of state intervention designed to accomplish the
wide distribution of productive property took shape throughout the
nineteenth century. Craig-Taylor identifies numerous land laws,
culminating in the 1862 Homestead Act, through which "hundreds
of millions of acres of federally held, public land were sold or given
away to state governments, settlers, railroads, squatters and land
companies." 179 During the same historical period, however, a new
industrial economy was taking shape that would dramatically alter
the material relationships among property ownership, citizenship,
and liberty. As greater numbers of Americans began working for
wage labor, and American law declined to intervene on behalf of
workers increasingly subject to control and manipulation by
employers,18 the locus of citizenship shifted away from the
archetypal Jeffersonian productive plot of land:
The republican vision of citizenship, Jefferson's vision of the
citizen-producer, had become a national folk ideal, but in practice,
for a growing majority of citizens, this vision had become an
impractical hope. ... The ideal citizen, a producer/owner who
both created value and used the newly created wealth, was
replaced by the wage employee who produced use-exchange
values for someone else. Independent, self-sustaining income
from the ownership of use-exchange values was replaced by
income derived from wage work. Therefore, building home
equity became the primary way that most working and middle-
class households could hope to accumulate property.
The family home, in this sense, replaced the family farm as the
paradigmatic form of property constitutive of citizenship.
Government policy accommodated this shift, which Craig-Taylor
labels the "neo-republican synthesis," through a "new homestead
strategy" aimed at increasing employment, providing access to
178. Id. at 49. The article quotes JOHN M. BLUM ET AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE
PART 1131 (7th ed. 1989) (1921), to the effect that "if America were to become like Europe,
with a mass of propertyless workers and peasants, liberty would fall with equality and
authority concentrated in the hands of a few [and it] would turn into tyranny."
179. Craig-Taylor, supra note 118, at 50.
180. Craig-Taylor identifies Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as a
paradigmatic example of this shift: "One consequence of this case was confirmation of
the gulf between liberty and the ownership of productive property with attendant
implications for access to the republican ideal of liberty and citizenship for a growing
majority of citizens. The primary means by which most citizens were to earn an
income-wage labor-was not invested with rights comparable to ownership of
property." Craig-Taylor, supra note 118, at 53.
181. Id. at 53.
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credit, and securing the right to buy and sell property."' As Craig-
Taylor makes very clear, however, "[a] significant exception was the
sustained and intentional public and private discrimination against
African Americans.'
83
The situation of homeless people in contemporary America, of
course, is not precisely analogous to that of African Americans
either before or after the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments. The obstacles to home ownership currently faced by
African Americans are very different from those facing homeless
people. Craig-Taylor's "neo-republican synthesis" model
nonetheless sheds light on the importance of property ownership to
participation in the structures of citizenship, and identifies critical
ways in which government policies impeding property ownership
interfere with citizen participation. In this sense, Craig-Taylor's
analysis dovetails with that of Nelson, Harrison, and other
commentators who would read the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment more broadly than current doctrine might allow.
E. Potential Objections to Constitutionalizing Homeless
People's Property Rights
Two general objections to this line of argument immediately
come to mind. First, the conditions of chattel slavery and
homelessness barely resemble one another; the architects of the
Reconstruction Amendments could not have had homelessness in
mind when they sought to abolish property disabilities. More
specifically, the property disabilities contested by the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments took the form of explicit class legislation
that barred or impeded African Americans from holding property.
In contrast, the property disability imposed on homeless people is
less explicit, more ad hoc, and generally difficult to locate even in
official municipal policies, much less in specific, formal legislation.
Second, homeless people may not suffer the same kind of property
disability as slaves because they, at least theoretically, still have a
property interest in their own labor. As such, homeless people can
still sell their labor for wages and escape their condition.
While the historical and material realities of slavery and
homelessness are in many ways utterly dissimilar, and the property
182. Id. at 54-55.
183. Id. at 55. Much of Professor Craig-Taylor's sweeping argument details how race-
based discrimination has prevented and continues to prevent African Americans from
obtaining the property necessary for full citizenship. See generally id. at 56-90.
184. As discussed in text accompanying notes 123-34, supra, William Nelson would
point out that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, by appealing to broad
conceptions of natural and citizens' rights, necessarily left such specific questions to the
courts for resolution.
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disabilities imposed on each class profoundly different, the broader
moral and philosophical considerations underlying the adoption of
the Reconstruction Amendments nonetheless partially answer the
first objection. These considerations also bear upon the second
objection; the Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts
explicitly regarded state interference with rights to real and personal
property, not merely property in self and labor, as constitutionally
significant.
1. The Property Disabilities Imposed on Homeless People are Informal
and Not Constitutionally Suspect
Unlike African Americans before abolition, homeless people are
not subject to explicit legal rules barring them from owning
property,8 5 nor are they openly considered non-people by the law.'
It is highly unlikely that any municipality would enact an ordinance
specifically prohibiting homeless people from owning property. As
such, one could argue that the difficulties homeless people face in
securing their personal belongings are unlike the property
disabilities addressed in the Reconstruction Amendments and the
Civil Rights Act, and are thus not constitutionally significant.
It is true that state laws both before and after abolition
contained explicit restraints on certain people's ability to exercise
property interests. This objection, however, hinges on an untenable
distinction between public and private law. The property disability
imposed on homeless people, arising from a conjunction of exercises
of local police power and judicial interpretations of resulting
constitutional challenges, is no less a function of law than the more
explicit disabilities found in nineteenth-century state legislation.
Justice Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases seemed to
acknowledge the difficulty of drawing such clear lines between
public and private law: "slavery cannot exist without law any more
than property in lands and goods can exist without law, and
therefore the thirteenth amendment may be regarded as nullifying
all state laws which establish or uphold slavery."'87 Justice Bradley's
reference to "all state laws which establish or uphold slavery"
indicates that state property laws perpetuating a property disability,
one of the badges and incidents of slavery, would be as
constitutionally objectionable as public laws perpetuating the
institution itself. Although the municipal practices that deprive
185. See Craig-Taylor, supra note 118, at 56-59. Craig-Taylor makes clear that in many
cases "free" African Americans as well as slaves were severely limited in their ability to
buy and own property as a result of their "ambiguous citizenship status" under
discriminatory state laws. Id. at 56.
186. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
187. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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homeless people of their property are dissimilar in many ways from
the kinds of state legislation at issue during the Reconstruction
debates and thereafter, in that they are generally uncodified and not
facially class-based, they do infringe dramatically on the ability of
homeless people to exercise property interests. Municipal policies
that violate constitutional rights, furthermore, may be actionable
under federal law regardless of whether they have been enacted into
specific legislation.'
Beyond this statutory theory of municipal liability, which courts
have construed narrowly to deprive dispossessed homeless people
of a remedy for their losses,'89 lie the broad conceptions of citizens'
rights and equal treatment that framed the Reconstruction
Amendments. If John Harrison is correct that the right to exercise
property interests is one of the privileges or immunities of
citizenship, and that the equality principle behind the Fourteenth
Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act prevents states from
denying privileges or immunities to certain classes of citizens, then
municipal policies singling out homeless people for dispossession
are constitutionally problematic. In this light, the participation of
federal courts in denying homeless people the ability to exercise a
property interest, much less an effective remedy for their losses, is
especially egregious. The Act of April 20, 1871, which created the
Section 1983 remedy currently relied on by most citizens challenging
deprivation of constitutional rights,9 ° specifically appealed to the
federal judiciary as a guardian of those rights against state and local
overreaching. In cases like D'Aguanno, Love, and Church,9 ' federal
judges are arguably contributing to the deprivation of broadly
construed constitutional rights instead of upholding the principles
of citizens' rights and equality that animated constitutional
discourse during Reconstruction.
2. Homeless People Retain Property in Their Bodies and Their Labor
One further objection to this constitutional line of argument is
that homeless people, regardless of their inability to exercise a
188. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dept. of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978) (holding that, "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983.").
189. See text accompanying notes 46-54, supra.
190. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (creating cause of action against
persons who violated constitutional rights under color of state law or other authority,
and specifying "such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts
of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error,
and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts").
191. See Part I, supra.
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secure interest in their personal property, still retain a property
interest in their bodies and their labor. Justice Field, in his Slaughter-
House dissent, objected on "free labor" grounds to the majority's
decision to uphold a Louisiana statute granting a virtual monopoly
to a few slaughterhouse owners."' In support of his objection,
Justice Field quoted Adam Smith: "The property which every man
has in his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other
property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. '"1 93 Homeless
people, by this account, still retain the ability to work and lift
themselves out of their impoverished condition. This is a familiar
suggestion, repeated regularly in contemporary public discourse
surrounding homelessness."'
This objection, however popular, is misplaced for at least two
basic reasons. First, homeless people are not free to engage in even
the most basic life activities. 19 A person unable to eat, sleep, or
relieve herself without running afoul of the law has at best a limited
kind of "property" in her body, and is inhibited in many ways from
effectively seeking employment. Without an address and a place to
shower, much less the resources to design, print, and send out
resumes, it may be extremely difficult to find many kinds of work.
Indeed, Justice Field's further invocation of Adam Smith seems
quite appropriate in this respect: "The patrimony of the poor man
lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder
him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he
thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of
this most sacred property. '' 99  Municipal policies that criminalize
homeless existence not only contribute to dispossession but also
inhibit homeless people's ability to find employment. In this sense,
such policies infringe even on the "most sacred property" of free
labor.
Second, the property interests considered fundamental to
liberty in the Reconstruction Amendments and the early Civil
Rights Acts were of the "real and personal" kind, 97 and not limited
to property in self and labor. The importance of real, productive
property to notions of citizenship and civic participation
192. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 110 (1873).
193. Id. at n.* (quoting SMITH'S WEALTH OF NATIONS, b.1, ch. 10, part 2).
194. See, e.g., Patricia Paquette, "Sympathy's Misplaced," Letter to the Editor, Boston
Herald (Jan. 23, 2002) at 024. Responding to an article about recent deaths among
Boston's homeless population, Ms. Paquette wrote, "Are we supposed to feel sorry for
the two young people on Page 3 who are supposedly homeless? They certainly look like
they are well able to go out and get a job and stop living off us .... Let them get off their
lazy butts and work like the rest of us."
195. See Part I.A., supra.
196. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 110 n.* (1873).
197. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
[Vol. 1
"OFFICER, WHERE'S MY STUFF?"
underscores the inappropriateness of limiting a citizen's ability to
exercise property interests in anything other than his body and
labor.19 8 The property disabilities contained in the Black Codes
passed by southern states immediately following the Civil War
would have imposed just such a limitation on African Americans;
these Black Codes were precisely the kind of state legislation-
legislation that abridged the privileges or immunities of American
citizens-that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
eliminate.199 In short, the fact that one may still retain a limited
property interest in one's labor does not justify the abrogation by
state and local authorities of every other kind of property interest.
III. Rights and Remedies
If homeless people are subject to a property disability, and if
such disabilities in general are constitutionally problematic,
questions still arise as to appropriate remedies. One might suggest,
following Harrison, that the right to personal property should be
recognized as fundamental and immune from any kind of state
abridgment. This suggestion, however, does not accurately reflect
Harrison's focus on the "equality principle" at work in
Reconstruction discourse, and may run a Lochner-like risk of
constitutionalizing specific property interests. Moving on from this
suggestion, one might think that the Takings Clause would be an
obvious remedy, although this approach is also problematic for
several reasons. Furthermore, many homeless litigants, and several
commentators, have argued (mostly in vain) that the homeless
should be considered a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Even if homeless litigants were to prevail in
such arguments, however, the remedy provided under a suspect
classification-strict scrutiny of municipal policies-may not be
sufficient. Such remedies do not address the more structural
conditions, such as the limitation on liberty imposed by basic
principles of property law, that contribute to the property disability
currently imposed on homeless people. Advocates for the homeless
have long argued that adequate, supportive housing, with treatment
for drug dependency and mental illness, is not only the most
humane and legally defensible approach to homelessness but also
the most cost-effective. Rather than spending enormous amounts of
money and energy criminalizing the homeless, municipalities
should be redirecting their efforts to housing and recovery.
198. See text accompanying notes 175-83, supra.
199. See Harrison, supra note 124, at 1402.
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A. A Fundamental Right to Property
One possible remedy would be to place all property rights
beyond the reach of state abridgment. At first glance, John
Harrison's placement of property rights among the privileges or
immunities of citizens, especially in the context of William Nelson's
historical rereading of Reconstruction discourse about fundamental
rights incident to liberty and citizenship, would seem to support
making the ownership of property a constitutional right immune to
state infringement. Libertarian legal academics indeed have
advanced such arguments. For example, Richard Epstein introduces
a recent article by quoting Justice Washington's observation in
Corfield v. Coryell that the right to property is among the privileges
and immunities, or fundamental civil rights, of citizens of all free
governments."' Notably, Epstein does not allow Justice Washington
to finish his sentence; Washington went on immediately to observe
that these fundamental property rights are "subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole."2 1 Harrison, by locating property rights
among a citizen's privileges and immunities, and locating those
rights within a broader "equality principle," makes clear that the
state may indeed regulate the property rights of its citizens so long
as it does so equally. Thus it is inaccurate to consider property
rights so fundamental as to be beyond infringement by the state.
Also following Harrison, homeless people could argue that
policies depriving them of property unequally abridge their
privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
arguments, at least theoretically, could provide some relief where
homeless people can demonstrate that they and their property have
been treated differently than other trespassers, pedestrians, or users
of public space. The Supreme Court's recent reliance on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe may indicate a
willingness to give it renewed substance. As discussed above,
however, Justice Stevens' decision still relies on Justice Miller's
majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, which rejected any
nationally-based citizens' right to property ownership. Although an
argument to include property rights among the privileges or
immunities of citizenship could be considered non-frivolous given
the careful historical analysis of Harrison and others, it may be
200. Richard Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187
(1992), quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Epstein argues
that private property should be considered fundamental for its universality and utility,
and that land use and labor market regulation should involve compensation because it
infringes on the free and efficient exercise of property rights.
201. 6 F. Cas. at 552.
202. Harrison, supra note 124, at 1453-54.
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unrealistic to expect that the Privileges or Immunities Clause will
provide any comprehensive, immediate relief for homeless people
suffering from dispossession.
B. A Question of "Just" Compensation
Homeless individuals and their advocates may wish to argue
that property seized from homeless people is seized for public use,
thus entitling its owners to compensation under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Although the possibility of a Takings
Clause remedy may bear examination in specific cases, on the whole
it may not provide an adequate remedy for dispossessed homeless
people.
From a practical standpoint, advocates pursuing challenges
under the Takings Clause need to weigh the benefits and
drawbacks. As discussed above, courts have had difficulty even
recognizing that homeless people possess any compensable
property interests, and have not applied takings standards equally
to cases involving the property of homeless people and others.2 3
Decisions such as Pottinger (and even Love) nonetheless show that
compensation may be required for at least some of the possessions
taken in property sweeps.
Harry Simon outlines the potential benefits, and some of the
limitations, of Fifth Amendment challenges to property seizure and
destruction.2 4 Echoing the discussion in Pottinger, Simon describes
the Fifth Amendment's "public use" requirement as "coterminous
with the scope of the government's police powers," and argues that
confiscating the property of homeless persons "could qualify as a
taking of property for public use."25 He also suggests that the
"nuisance exception" to the Takings Clause, which allows officials
to abate a nuisance without compensation, would not excuse
property seizures because "local officials must show that the
possession of property by the homeless constitutes an active menace
to the public good. The mere possession of property by homeless
persons falls far short of the type of nuisance that can be abated
without just compensation. ' 2' For Simon, property sweeps are
clearly uncompensated takings, and subject to Fifth Amendment
challenge. Simon also argues that the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause should apply to seizures of homeless people's
property for several reasons, including the inability of a later
203. Sec Part I.C., supra.
204. Simon, supra note 5, at 673-75.




HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
hearing to correct the damage done by the seizure, the insufficiency
of common law tort actions as a remedy for deprivation, and the
tremendous implications of being deprived of everything one
208owns.
Simon nonetheless points to some of the limitations of the
Takings Clause in the context of property sweeps. Because
compensation for a taking is available after the fact, the Takings
Clause cannot support a prospective claim for equitable relief. In
other words, the Fifth Amendment does not protect against a
deprivation of property, but only provides for compensation after
the deprivation has occurred. 2°9 Nonetheless, Simon's suggestion
that homeless people are entitled to due process before they are
deprived of their property might support a claim for injunctive relief
prior to deprivation. Furthermore, takings claims are not ripe until
the plaintiffs have sought redress at the local and/or state levels.21 °
This places an enormous burden on homeless people, who must
find the time and resources to initiate not just one but potentially
several successive actions in order to recover the value of their
property.
Finally, any attempt to widen the ambit of the Takings Clause
should be undertaken with great care. By way of example, the
formalist "bundle of rights" analysis exemplified in Seawall could
arguably offer greater recognition and protection of homeless
people's property interests, but would also have an enormous effect
on a wide range of other regulations. Advocates thus should be
especially careful in their arguments that they do not open the door
to indiscriminate, radical expansion of the Takings Clause. A small
victory for a homeless plaintiff could translate into a huge defeat for
a number of other important causes that depend on the
government's ability to regulate private property.
In summary, the Takings Clause offers at best a possibility of ex
post facto relief for homeless people deprived of their possessions,
although the vagaries of individual decisions render the extent of
compensation uncertain. Future expansion of the Takings Clause
could augment this protection, but only at the risk of seriously
undermining other forms of legitimate government regulation.
Taken on its own, the Takings Clause may provide only limited
relief to homeless people, relief likely to be literally too little, too
late.
208. Id. at 674-75.
209. Id. at 674 n.273.
210. Id.
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C. Homelessness as a Suspect Classification
The notion of a "suspect class" arises from the famous footnote
in which the Supreme Court observed that "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." "' At first
glance, homelessness-a discrete category marked by certain self-
evident characteristics such as a shopping cart, bundles or bags of
belongings, or disheveled appearance 1-seems to be a natural fit
for such inquiry. The homeless are a minority, constituting between
one-tenth to three-tenths of a percent of the general population.213
Finally, the prejudice of the housed majority contributes
significantly to the exclusion of homeless people from the political
process. Thus it would seem that courts would subject legislation
and policy that disproportionately affects the homeless to a greater
degree of scrutiny.
Legal scholars have argued in different contexts that the
homeless should be recognized as a suspect class,"' or at least as a
quasi-suspect class.1  The judiciary, however, has been
overwhelmingly unwilling to do so. Although there is no Supreme
Court decision directly on point, courts routinely refuse to recognize
homelessness as a suspect classification.216 Courts tend to follow
three different strands of reasoning in reaching this conclusion. In
Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, the court appeared to hold
that suspect classifications are limited to "race or gender." '217 Other
211. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
212. These are the familiarly stereotypical indicia of "homelessness." The actual
condition of homelessness, however, is more varied and difficult to define. For purposes
of certain kinds of aid to states, the federal government defines "homelessness" as
lacking a "fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence," or having a nighttime
residence that is a shelter, institution, or "public or private place not designed for, or
ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings." See 42
U.S.C.A. § 11302.
213. See range of estimates supra, note 3.
214. See Jason Leckerman, City of Brotherly Love? Using the Fourteenth Amendment to
Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 540, 561-65
(2001) (arguing that exclusion from the political process renders the homeless a suspect
class).
215. Christine L. Bella & David L. Lopez, Quality of Life-At What Price? Constitutional
Challenges to Laws Adversely Impacting the Homeless, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 89,
121ff. (1994).
216. See Wright, supra note 5, at 198 n.519 (collecting cases).
217. 846 F. Supp. 843, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (reading Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-74 (1979), to indicate that only racial and gender
classifications are suspect). Janet Halley points out that this narrow reading of the Equal
Protection Clause "has not carried the day." See Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
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courts simply declare without analysis-or follow as precedent
earlier decisions that declared without analysis-that the homeless
are not a suspect class.2"' Finally, many courts conflate homelessness
with poverty, then go on to cite Supreme Court cases holding that
poverty alone does not give rise to a suspect classification.21 9
Homelessness, however, is not identical to poverty, although
the two conditions may be very closely related. The concept of
homelessness implicates wealth relations only indirectly.220 The
primary thrust of homeless status concerns a crucial property
relation. None of the cases holding that poverty alone cannot
trigger strict scrutiny examines the ways in which lack of a home
contributes to the overwhelming disenfranchisement and
oppression of homeless people. The home in liberal theory is central
to the exercise of numerous important liberties. According to
Waldron, people without homes lack the private and defensible
space necessary to perform essential life functions.22' Margaret Jane
Radin goes a step further, finding that the home is the paradigmatic
instance of "property for personhood," property she deems essential
to the constitution and full development of human personality.2
Lack of this space for full personal development is the precise
property relation that defines homeless status. Craig-Taylor details
the ways in which African Americans are still deprived of access to
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 917
n.10 (1989).
218. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992), is perhaps the "leading
case" in this respect. To describe the holding in Kreimer as "conclusory" is generous;
the court merely states in a footnote that the homeless are not a suspect class. Id. at 1269
n.36. Other courts have had no trouble citing this bald declaration as authority in
dismissing suspect class arguments. See, e.g., D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879
n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996);
Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5 th Cir. 1995); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353,
1357-58 (11th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases, including Kreimer, and declaring that
"[clonsequently, rational basis review is appropriate.").
219. See, e.g., D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 827 F. Supp. 1558, 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1993). The
opinion cites Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980), which in turn locates the sources
of this rule in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Some legal commentators have acceded to
the slippage from "homeless" to "poor." See, e.g., Robert C. McConkey III, "Camping
Ordinances" And The Homeless: Constitutional And Moral Issues Raised By Ordinances
Prohibiting Sleeping In Public Areas, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 633, 649 (1995-96).
220. See Leckerman, supra note 214, at 563-64 ("To say that economics is solely
responsible for homelessness belies the evidence of the many causes and characteristics
of homelessness that show otherwise .... Homelessness is a state of being, not merely an
economic class.").
221. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 301-03.
222. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-92
(1982).
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the type of property most essential to our contemporary
understanding of republican citizenship.22 3  Furthermore, as
municipal dispossession policies and numerous court decisions
indicate, homeless people cannot even securely exercise a property
interest in their personal belongings. As a condition in which lack of
one type of property considered essential to subjecthood and
citizenship defeats the ability to own any other type of property,
homelessness consigns a discrete and insular minority of Americans
to a status outside full legal personhood. This is exactly the type of
classification that equal protection analysis should find suspect.
Supreme Court precedents focusing on poverty as a potentially
suspect classification do not engage in, and thus arguably do not
foreclose, this type of analysis.
Beyond these philosophical arguments, homeless people and
their advocates can certainly point to the ways in which homeless
status impinges upon access to the political process.224 Many of the
tools used by municipalities to criminalize homeless existence-
ordinances prohibiting panhandling, anti-camping ordinances, laws
banning sleeping in public, and the like-are adopted in
majoritarian political settings to which the homeless do not have
ready access. Daniel Levin has argued that access to this political
process itself is among the privileges or immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Levin identifies two major
interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.227 The first,
epitomized by Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases,
would "render the clause a nearly empty set"; the second, following
Justice Bradley's Slaughter-House dissent and Justice Black's
incorporation jurisprudence, would "read richer unenumerated
rights into the clause, hinting that a modern judiciary could protect
these substantive rights not just pursuant to current due process
223. Craig-Taylor, supra note 118.
224. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("This
court is not entirely convinced that homelessness as a class has none of [the] 'traditional
indicia of suspectness.' It can be argued that the homeless are saddled with such
disabilities, or have been subjected to a history of unequal treatment or are so politically
powerless that extraordinary protection of the homeless as a class is warranted.").
225. Many commentators locate the primary significance of the Carolene Products
footnote in its discussion of political representation. The classic argument to this effect is
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
Prejudice by a majority may indicate a "distortion of the political process under which
certain minorities are rendered politically powerless," thus necessitating special action
and scrutiny on the part of the judiciary. See FARBER, ESKRIDGE, AND FRICKEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (2d Ed. 1998).
226. Levin, supra note 156.
227. Id. at 571.
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analysis, but with the Privileges or Immunities Clause as well." '228
Levin's argument challenges both of these readings as overlooking a
middle position: that the normative content of the "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" is embedded in
conceptions of structural participation of self-government rather
than in more general notions of personal liberty... [i.e.] the
participatory privileges that make up a citizen's architectural role in
the political and judicial process of civil government.229
For Levin, the representation-reinforcing, political process
rights currently understood as arising from a concurrent reading of
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses find better textual
support in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.23 Levin sees the
Slaughter-House Court's obsession with personal liberty and
autonomy as having "bleached out" the Fourteenth Amendment's
commitment to citizens' structural political participation, although
the "structural privileges of citizenship (rather than the liberty rights
of due process) worked as a strong undercurrent in many
participatory rights decisions of the Warren Court and have worked
more subtly in decisions since., 23 1  Thus access to the political
process itself arguably should be considered a fundamental right of
citizenship.
Jason Leckerman identifies two reasons that the homeless
should be considered politically powerless and thus a suspect class
for equal protection purposes. First, the political process "caters to
those who vote."23 2  Homeless people, by virtue of a lack of
education and/or a transient existence, may have great difficulty
availing themselves of this privilege.233 Second, the political process
"caters to those who have money. ' 234  Leckerman concludes that
"because the homeless have historically had no political power and
have not influenced the political process through either of the two
228. Id. at 570-71.
229. Id. at 571.
230. Id. at 572-73.
231. Id. at 573.
232. Leckerman, supra note 214, at 564.
233. Id. at 564-65. Although some cities have recently enacted special policies to
facilitate voter registration, homeless people have not achieved many remarkable gains
through the political process and are still largely disenfranchised. See David L.
Rosendorf, Homelessness and the Uses of Theory: An Analysis of Economic and Personality
Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights and Squatting Rights, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 701, 717-22 (1991).
234. Leckerman, supra note 214, at 565. Leckerman quotes Justice Marshall's dissent
in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 n.4 (1984):
"[tlhough numerically significant, the homeless are politically powerless inasmuch as
they lack the financial resources to obtain access to many of the most effective means of
persuasion."
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means through which citizens can do so, the vote or the dollar, they
constitute a discrete and insular minority."
235
One objection to this type of analysis-and, indeed, to any type
of argument that homelessness should be suspect-is that the
category of "homelessness" itself is not rigid or immutable in the
ways that other suspect classifications, such as race and gender, are
supposed to be.236  The Supreme Court's analysis in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,237 relied upon by various
lower courts in refusing to recognize homelessness as a suspect
238class, turns in part on whether a boundary firm enough for equal
protection purposes can be drawn around the category of poverty.239
Because "poor" is a relative and shifting classification rather than
one that signals an absolute deprivation of some identifiable good,
the Court refused to hold that the residents of impoverished school
districts in San Antonio were a protected class.24 ° Courts might raise
similar objections to an argument that homeless people constitute a
suspect class. Homeless people at least theoretically could find the
235. Leckerman, supra note 214, at 565.
236. Recent legal scholarship, incorporating theories about the social construction of
identity, has demonstrated how supposedly immutable categories such as "race" and
"gender" vary considerably from situation to situation, depending upon who is
delineating the boundaries of the classification and for what purpose. Ian Haney-Lopez
argues that the law plays a critical role in constructing and reinforcing both the
ideological content and the material reality of racial subordination. See Ian Haney-
Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). Haney-Lopez captures the complexities inherent in
the social construction of race very nicely: "Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but
rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro forces of
social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions." Id. at 7. See also
Halley, supra note 217, at 924 ("If immutability were a requirement for strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause, race could not be a suspect classification .... [Tihe
very conception of race, and the taxonomy of "races," are products of culture rather than
of nature .... If the boundaries between races can shift, the racial categorization of
individuals can shift-a profound source of mutability.") This kind of scholarship
suggests that the law itself (re)produces, rather than merely depends upon, the
"immutability" of the classifications on which equal protection jurisprudence sometimes
relies.
237. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
238. See note 218, supra.
239. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, criticized the District Court for failing to
consider "the hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for
purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged 'poor'
cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and whether the
relative-rather than absolute-nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant
consequence." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
240. Distinguishing prior cases in which poverty had resulted in some clear and
absolute kind of deprivation, Justice Powell criticized the plaintiffs for failing to
"[define] the term 'poor' with reference to any absolute or functional level of impecunity."
Id. at 19 n.49 (emphasis added).
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assistance or resources necessary to put an end to their homeless
status. Furthermore, the conditions of homelessness (in terms of
dcprivations suffered and legal barriers imposed) vary widely
between and even within jurisdictions. Accordingly, a court might
follow Justice Powell's lead in Rodriguez, and refuse to recognize
that homelessness is immutable enough even to warrant definition,
much less protection.41
This objection ignores, however, the extent to which the
"traditional indicia of suspectness"' are materially present for
people who are homeless, regardless of whether they may at one
time have been or might in the future again be housed. With respect
to the first part of the Rodriguez test, homeless people are subject at
any given moment to arbitrary deprivations of property and liberty.
Their most fundamental life activities are regulated and proscribed,
they lack any permissible place in which to be, and they cannot
exercise a recognized property interest in their most valued personal
possessions. These are profound disabilities that indicate not only
the suspectness of homelessness but also the sub-person status it
imposes. Moving on to the second part of the test, city councils and
business leaders openly conspire to drive the homeless from the
areas in which they live. Journalists and housed citizens react to
their very presence with disgust and horror. Twentieth-century
popular Americana is replete with references to the ill treatment of
the vagrant, the hobo, the bag lady, the bum. These are certainly
indications of a history of purposeful unequal treatment. Finally,
homeless people face incredible difficulty registering to vote and
otherwise participating in the political process. It seems the height
of callousness for courts to refuse special scrutiny of laws that
disadvantage homeless people because particular individuals might
one day no longer be among the group thus disadvantaged.
241. In a slightly different context involving an Eighth Amendment challenge to San
Francisco's anti-homeless "Matrix" program, the District Court held that
"fundamentally, homelessness is not readily classified as a 'status."' Joyce v. City & Cty.
of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The court took great pains to
differentiate the "condition" of homelessness from a "status" like drug addiction,
holding that "[t]o argue that homelessness is a status and not a condition.., is to deny
the efficacy of acts of social intervention to change the condition of those currently
homeless." Id. The court then declined to engage in any such intervention by refusing
relief from the anti-homeless ordinances and enforcement policies that became notorious
under "Matrix": "it would be an untoward excursion by this Court into matters of social
policy to accord to homelessness the protection of status." Id. at 858.
242. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 ("The system of alleged discrimination and the class it
defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.").
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The notion of immutability thus should not distract courts from
what many consider to be the central purpose of the Carolene
Products footnote: to protect minorities from burdens imposed by a
distorted majoritarian political process. Janet Halley argues
persuasively that "immutability is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient precondition for the recognition of a suspect classification,
and where it has appeared as a factor in the Court's analysis, it has
always been shorthand for inquiry into the fairness of the political
process burdening the group."24  For Halley, the suspect class
inquiry is better characterized as a search for "acute vulnerability in
the political process" rather than an inquiry into the "immutability
of any trait uniting or defining the group."2" This observation not
only lends additional weight to the more traditional political process
argument24 but also provides a basis for distinguishing, or better,
revisiting, Rodriguez and its progeny. Se-Teral key factors attendant
upon homelessness-difficulty registering to vote, lack of access to
politicians and the media, and sub-citizen status imposed by a
property disability-directly impede homeless people's access to
municipal political processes and local political discourse. It is the
inability of the homeless to participate in the political process that
defines and constrains their existence, not their poverty, which
requires strict scrutiny of legislation and policies that contribute to
their disenfranchisement.
This latter point is important.246 It is in the debates among
policymakers and in the pages of newspapers that the popular
understanding of homelessness is constructed and municipal
approaches to homeless existence are formulated. Letters from
suburban shoppers and tourists to the editors of metropolitan
papers frame policies aimed at excluding the homeless from
commercial centers. Stereotypical representations of filth, addiction,
and begging, repeated by influential journalists, shape policies
aimed at "cleaning up" cities. These policies target public sleeping,
243. Halley, supra note 217, at 926.
244. Id. at 926-927.
245. See text accompanying notes 225-35, supra.
246. The argument that follows owes a great deal to Janet Halley, who argues that the
process of ascribing homosexual identity, whether enacted by a legal regime or assumed
by an individual, is always political and generally fraught with material consequences.
She analogizes the process of gay and lesbian identity formation to political speech,
demonstrates that antihomosexual discrimination interferes with this critical aspect of
this political process, and concludes on this basis that "homosexual" should be a suspect
classification. See Halley, supra note 217, at 918-20, 963-76. While the contexts in which
"homosexual" and "homeless" identity are constructed and ascribed are completely
different, Halley's argument nonetheless points to the critical role played by identity
formation in framing, and often distorting, the political process that equal protection
doctrine aims to safeguard.
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panhandling, and urination-in essence, all of the basic life activities
that homeless people are unable to perform in private. Thus
homeless people generally do not participate in the popular and
legal construction of what it means to be a homeless person; it
follows that they have little influence over the enactment of punitive
and discriminatory policies shaped by popular representations of
what honelessness means. The homeless not only have immense
trouble registering, voting, and influencing the outcome of city
council meetings and internal police department procedures, but
also play only an attenuated role in the often more important
process of framing the relevant issues for debate, the most crucial of
which is what it means to be homeless.
The homeless should be treated as a suspect class, therefore, on
two grounds. First, cases holding that poverty is not a suspect
classification can be distinguished because homelessness as a status
concerns a property relation rather than a relative degree of wealth.
Second, homeless people meet the tests set out in Rodriguez for a
class displaying all the requisite "indicia of suspectness," chiefly
their vulnerability to burdensome and discriminatory laws and
policies adopted through majoritarian political processes to which
they have limited access. These processes define not only what they
may and may not do, but also who they are, in the eyes of the law.
The homeless do not represent themselves fully in any of these
processes, and thus require the special protection envisioned in the
Carolene Products footnote.
D. Toward a Right to Shelter
None of the remedies considered in this section, however,
address the primary problem posed by Jeremy Waldron: that the
homeless, because of the operation of background property
principles, have no place to be. This condition exposes homeless
people's personal belongings to most of the depredations
considered in this paper. Unable to be anywhere legally, homeless
people and their belongings both suffer. While creative
constitutional arguments and individual lawsuits may provide some
relief, the only truly adequate remedy for the property disability
imposed on homeless people is a remedy for homelessness itself.
To this end, government should provide secure and permanent
shelter for everyone who needs it. Constitutional arguments based
on a property disability may not entirely compel this conclusion,
although to the extent such arguments demand an effective remedy,
they do support it. So do empirical studies of supportive housing,
247. See Part I.A.1, supra.
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mental health, and drug treatment programs. 248 The unequal
treatment of homeless people imposes huge costs on society, both
financial 249 and moral. Indeed, taking the moderately redistributive
steps necessary to guarantee permanent housing and adequate
treatment for the nation's homeless could prove both more
constitutionally palatable and more cost-effective than continuing
an ad hoc policy of repression, incarceration, and dispossession.2
Conclusion
The condition of homelessness and the response of both
municipalities and courts to homeless people combine to undermine
homeless people's ability to exercise a property interest in their
personal belongings. While this can be characterized as a de facto
property disability, it is nonetheless rooted in law. Local exercises
of police power, background property and trespass principles, and
the vagaries of jurisprudence are among the primary socio-legal
factors currently depriving homeless people of their last remaining
belongings. Given the history of the Reconstruction Amendments
and the broad principles of citizens' rights that supported the
abolition of slavery, the creation of a new property disability and its
imposition on modem American citizens should be considered
constitutionally troubling enough to justify adequate remedies.
Rather than pursue policies of criminalization, harassment,
depersonalization, and dispossession in the streets and the courts of
our country, governments from the local to the federal should join
with homeless people in an effort to provide safe, supportive, and
permanent shelter for America's dispossessed.
248. Hoge, supra note 9, at A20. Hoge cites a University of Pennsylvania study
concluding that "it costs nearly the same amount of taxpayer money to keep [some 5,000
mentally ill homeless] people on the streets as it does to give them permanent housing
with voluntary services for mental health, substance abuse and employment issues."
Another study cited in the article, by the Goldman School of Public Policy at the
University of California, Berkeley, found that supportive housing dramatically reduced
the health care costs of homeless and inadequately housed participants.
249. By one estimate, San Francisco spends "about $22,000 every hour on homeless
people." Hoge, supra note 58, at Al. This figure ostensibly includes the $650,000 per
year that the city spends on confiscating shopping carts full of homeless people's
belongings. See Hoge, supra note 60, at Al. In all fairness, San Francisco is also
recognized as a leading city in terms of supportive housing and other services. See Hoge,
supra note 9, at A20.
250. "Studies show that the United States could clear its streets of most of the
homeless, and ultimately save money, if it would just commit nationally to providing
permanent, supportive housing to all who need it.... Despite evidence that such
housing could provide a national solution to the problem of homelessness, there is little
political will to turn funding in this direction." Id.
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